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Ukraine came into the spotlight of public and academic interest as a site of rapid 
nation-building after the events of 2013–2014. Then, a series of civic protests 
(dubbed ‘The Revolution of Dignity’) led to the ousting of the pro-Russian 
president, a change in government and a shift in foreign policy orientation 
towards the European Union. This created significant tensions in the entangled 
relationship between Ukraine and Russia, which ultimately resulted in the 
Russian Federation unlawfully annexing a region of Ukraine, the Crimean 
Peninsula, and engaging in an outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine on the 
side of separatist forces.  
Thus, Ukraine has become a site of conflict, and this conflict has largely been 
interpreted in the tradition of previous research on Ukrainian identity. Most 
authors have analysed the situation in the disputed regions of Ukraine (Crimea 
and the east) in structuralist terms: as an ethnic conflict generated by the tension 
between Ukrainian and Russian interlinked structures (economic, political and 
historical entanglement, and the widespread use of the Russian language) and 
power competition, in particular between the Ukrainian-speaking and the 
Russian-speaking regions (Giuliano, 2018; Lutz, 2017).  
On the other hand, some authors (Arel, 2018; Kulyk, 2014, 2016; Kuzio, 
2015b, 2015a) have focussed on the changes in Ukraine’s national identity dis-
course1 as a result of the conflict. They propose that the Ukrainian narrative of 
the national identity2 has become more widely accepted in the polarised context, 
while regional and supra-national (Slavic and Soviet) identity narratives have 
subsided (Kulyk, 2017). This has happened as a result of the distancing of 
Ukraine from Russia in various spheres and levels (Kuzio, 2015b, 2015a). Some 
researchers state that Ukrainian and Russian national identity narratives have 
become more ethnocentric, focused on specific group characteristics, e.g. shared 
language and culture (Teper, 2016), while others emphasise the civic and 
inclusive nature of the national identity narrative in Ukraine after the protests 
(Bureiko & Moga, 2019; Kulyk, 2018). At the same time, some studies point 
out that the Ukrainian society is still characterised by widespread use of the 
Russian language and the consumption of Russian media (Nikitina, 2020), and 
                                                                        
1  De Celia et al. (1999) point to language and discourse as the main means through which 
distinct imagined communities of nations (Anderson, 1983, p. 133) are created and re-
produced. The national identity, following De Celia et al. (1999), is the product that presents 
the community’s uniqueness and its values. This product is ‘constructed and conveyed using 
the means of language and discourse, predominantly in narratives of national culture’ (De 
Celia et al, 1999, p. 22). 
2  Patterson & Monroe (1998) define a narrative as ‘ways in which we construct disparate 
facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our 
reality’ (p.1). The narratives of national culture/identity are thus stories we tell about our 
nations. Bruner (1996) points out that the narratives of national history and culture often 
function as spaces of contestation (p.88). 
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there is evidence that the Ukrainian people are engaging in active sense-making 
when confronted with conflicting media narratives surrounding the conflict 
(Szostek, 2017).  
To summarise, two main approaches to describing and explaining the changes 
in identity discourse in Ukraine have appeared since the start of the conflict. 
The first one is the structuralist and conflict theory-driven view, which emphas-
ises power struggles and competition for resources, as well as structure pre-
requisites (linguistic diversity, political entanglement with Russia, issues of 
media ownership, and the larger conflict between Russia and the EU), as the 
primary causes of internal conflict in Ukraine. The other view, driven by the 
constructivist paradigm, shifts the focus to the changing national identity dis-
course in Ukraine, how the narrative of the national identity is being reformu-
lated as a result of the conflict with Russia, and taken up by the population (both 
Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking). However, both of these views approach the 
issue of national identity in a top-down manner. My study, on the other hand, 
offers a historicised, bottom-up investigation of how national identity is being 
constructed and negotiated by the ordinary people on the basis of their everyday 
experiences in the context of the conflict outbreak in the social site of histori-
cally intertwined structures.  
With this study, I want to address the puzzle of changes in the identity con-
struction of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the conflict context from the socio-
logical and ethnographic perspectives. The studies focus on the parts of the 
Ukrainian population that, for the purposes of consistency, are referred to as 
‘Russian-speaking Ukrainians’: current (or, in the case of Crimean residents, 
former) citizens of Ukraine who use Russian as their main language of commu-
nication. I leave the question of ethnic belonging, so often simplified in scholarly 
works on Ukraine, open, to show the interaction between local, regional, national 
and supra-national identifications. The study participants speak Russian and are 
largely rooted in the Ukrainian society, but their identifications tend to be frag-
mented and fall somewhere in between ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ and ‘ethnic Russian’.  
The study is positioned at the intersection of sociology, political science, 
media studies and area studies, with the emphasis on sociology. Firstly, I want 
to offer a direct contribution to the empirical knowledge of modern Ukrainian 
studies by examining changes in national identity narratives and the con-
struction of group boundaries by Russian-speaking Ukrainians after the events 
of 2013. I achieve this by engaging with personal identity narratives collected 
from in-depth interviews of the ordinary people that reflect the dynamic of 
changes in narratives and performances of national identity during the crisis.  
More importantly, I want to address the lack of engagement with the concept 
of national identity in Ukraine and other post-communist societies in the onto-
logical sense. Recent research has approached the topic of Ukrainian identity 
from ahistorical and essentialising positions, while in this study I want to de-
abstract the concept of the identity of the subject and re-settle it in the particular 
time, social relations, institutional practices and collective memory that posed 
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the question, in other words to explore the identity of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians ‘empirically and historically’ (Somers and Gibson, 1993, p. 25).  
To achieve this goal, I have synthesised a theoretical framework that combines 
concepts of ontological narrativity and symbolic boundaries, which are useful 
for understanding changes in identity construction performed at the popular 
level, with cultural trauma, which is used to conceptualise changes in public 
discourse during turbulent social events. I have also employed the transnation-
alism approach to address the ambiguity of identity construction in conflict in 
the context of rising global mobility and the diversity of cultural practices in 
Ukraine. In this study, I am making a theoretical contribution to the body of 
knowledge on the identity construction of subjects in the context of conflict 
with a historically dominant imperial power (Morozov, 2013), by applying a 
novel theoretical framework that considers both the particular historical socio-
cultural context and modern globalising trends.  
This cover article is connected with three studies (Study I, Study II and 
Study III) conducted in 2016–2018 in de jure Ukraine (Crimea and Kyiv) with 
participants affected by the conflict. The studies employed qualitative methods 
(semi-structured interviews and interactive exercises) to examine narratives and 
strategies used by the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the conflict context to 
construct and negotiate the boundaries of national identity. The bulk of the 
empirical data was collected in Crimea in 2016 and in Kyiv (with participants 
from various regions) in 2018 and focused on the different ways people narrated 
the events of 2013–2014 (Study I and II) and their (online) media use practices 
in the context of those events (Study III). The studies were connected with how 
the Russian-speaking Ukrainian population makes sense of the polarisation 
resulting from conflict and the different meanings attributed to their earlier 
established practices of speaking Russian and following Russian media. The 
study interprets the findings in the context of larger shifts in the Ukrainian 
national identity discourse. 
The cover article is structured as follows. First, I present the case study con-
text, which provides the necessary background to interpret my research results. 
Then I outline the theoretical framework, which supports the research questions 
and explains both the theoretical and empirical gaps that are addressed by my 
research. The next chapter outlines the research question, as well as the sub-
questions that are explored in the three studies. I follow up with the 
methodological framework of the studies. I then proceed to present the results, 
followed by the conclusions and discussion chapters.  
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2. CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
Engaging with the process of national identity construction at the popular level 
requires an in-depth discussion of the historical, political, economic, societal 
and symbolic contexts of the case, which act as a complex background to the 
identity construction and negotiation processes that have happened among the 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians since the events of 2013–2014. This context helps 
justify the need for a new framework for studying identity construction, in post-
communist and other societies, in the context of conflict. Based on the empirical 
case description, I will propose a reconceptualisation of the object of study – 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ identifications – that departs from previous ap-
proaches to studying the issue of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. 
 
 
2.1. Political situation in Ukraine: 2013 and onwards 
Since regaining independence, Ukraine has been faced with the challenges of 
building a cohesive national identity narrative in the presence of two factors: 
widespread use of the Russian language and close political involvement with 
Russia in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bureiko & Moga, 
2019). These factors maintained their significance over the course of political 
developments in the 1990s and 2000s. Some authors have questioned the success 
of the Ukrainian (elite) nation-building project (Polese, 2011). Particular aspects 
of the historical development of some Ukrainian regions, as well as the Soviet 
legacy (e.g. policies of Russification and the mixing of ethnicities), created a 
specific socio-linguistic situation in independent Ukraine (Mitchnik, 2019), 
with divisions along several lines, and the rise of several ‘borderland’ regions 
with distinct hybrid and subliminal identities (Kuromiya, 2003, 2008). While 
the Russian language lost its role and associated status in Ukraine after the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, it remained widespread and blended seamlessly 
into various life spheres (Mitchnik, 2019); the Russian-speaking regions later 
emerged as poles of political power and vision in Ukraine. This runs counter to 
the narrative later perpetrated by Russia, which painted the Crimea and 
Donetsk/Luhansk regions as settlement areas of ‘ethnic Russian minority’ that 
needed protection against discrimination (Allison, 2014); in reality, Ukrainians 
and Russians became tightly intertwined, creating paradoxes for the nation-
building project during later times of crisis. 
Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s was and still remains a country where the 
majority of inhabitants identify as Ukrainian (according to the last national 
census in 2001, 77%), with about 17% identifying as ‘ethnic Russian’. According 
to a poll conducted by the Razumkov centre (2017), 68% of the population 
considers Ukrainian their mother tongue, 14% considers it to be Russian, and 
17% both Ukrainian and Russian. However, the linguistic divisions do not 
coincide with the ethnic group boundaries, as large shares of the population 
either speak Russian in everyday life out of habit or necessity (often in industrial 
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workplaces and urban areas, which is a legacy of Soviet Russification), speak 
both languages interchangeably or use a colloquial mix of Ukrainian and Russian 
(surzhyk). In other words, language use in Ukraine is fragmented and fluid, and 
offers limited insight into subjects’ self-identifications. What matters is not 
which language somebody speaks, but why they speak it, and where (which 
region) they come from (Kulyk, 2017). 
In the course of the political developments of the 1990s a symbolic division 
crystallised between the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking eastern regions, with 
strong industry from Soviet times and ties to Russia, and the overwhelmingly 
Ukrainian-speaking western regions, with strong cultural foundations and a 
general orientation towards the European Union. This tension, fuelled by 
opposing views of Ukraine’s foreign policy, as well as its memory politics, 
produced two major political poles: the ‘Party of Regions’ (led by V. Ianu-
kovych, with a strong base in the eastern regions) and ‘Our Ukraine’ (led by 
V. Iushenko, with a leaning towards Ukrainian nationalism).  
In 2004, the events of the Orange Revolution had a pro-Western candidate 
become president (‘Our Ukraine’), while the pendulum swung in the opposite 
direction when a pro-Russian candidate from the ‘Party of Regions’ (Viktor 
Ianukovych) won the elections in 2010. This dynamic defined the internal 
political discourse in Ukraine throughout the 2000s: politically active, EU-
oriented, Ukrainian speaking, ‘nationalist’ western regions (the symbolic ‘West’) 
vs. mainly apolitical, well-off3, industrial Russia-oriented and predominantly 
Russian-speaking eastern regions (the symbolic ‘East’), with Crimea (over-
whelmingly Russian-speaking) remaining a peripheral (not so well off) region 
with a special/strategic status (the location of the Black Sea Fleet) and not much 
political influence. Of course, this picture is oversimplified: the language and 
ethnic dynamics were far more complex and not geographically bound, under-
lying economic interests heated up the ‘identitarian’ memory debates, and 
topics of ethnicity and national identity were exploited in the media controlled 
by various political forces. All of this came to a head in the winter of 2013, 
when President Ianukovych’s unpopular decision to back out of the Association 
deal with the EU led to mass protests (dubbed ‘Euromaidan’ or ‘Maidan’ or 
‘The Revolution of Dignity’) in multiple Ukrainian cities, soon turning violent 
in Kyiv. The Maidan protests led to the ousting of the president and a change in 
government in 2014. Various grass-roots movements and activists of Maidan 
joined the new establishment, or at least gained notoriety, such as the ‘Right 
Sector’ (Praviy sektor), a nationalist para-military party.  
The rise of far-right movements and the revival of a Ukrainian nationalist 
agenda, though still marginal in the political discourse, was exploited in the 
Russian media, framing protest events as a ‘fascist coup’ and alleging possible 
violations of the rights of Ukrainian Russian-speakers (living mostly in the 
eastern and southern regions of Ukraine).  
                                                                        
3  Even after the start of fighting in 2014, the Donetsk oblast remained second in salary 
growth after the capital (Kyiv), according to O. Kramar (2019) in Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 
(calculations based on state statistics): https://tyzhden.ua/Economics/234522  
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Figure 1. Competing framings of the Euromaidan events. 
 
While the political situation was unstable in Ukraine, in the context of Ukrainian 
and Russian media producing opposing narratives, two major events occurred: 
firstly, Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014 (as a result of an internationally 
unrecognised referendum); secondly, separatist movements surged in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions in April 2014, resulting in a proclamation by the 
unrecognised Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic 
(LNR), with the support of Russia. Both actions were justified by the Russian 
Federation by the desire to ‘protect ethnic Russian speakers’ from repression by 
‘nationalising’ Ukraine (Allison, 2014). The events of the Revolution of Dignity, 
Crimean annexation and the outbreak of hostilities in the east, as reflected in 
popular narratives, are at the centre of Studies I and II. 
Russia has been implicated in both of these major geopolitical developments: 
conducting information warfare in the media largely consumed in southern/ 
eastern regions, pursuing creeping intervention followed by a quickly organised 
referendum in Crimea, and supplying separatist forces in Donetsk and Luhansk 
with armaments (Allison, 2014). In the rhetoric preceding the annexation of 
Crimea, the issue of Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine was framed in 
terms of an identifier for an ethnic Russian minority, part of the Russian world 
(Feklyunina, 2016).  
On the other hand, the Russian language was seen and framed in the public 
debate as a threat to the Ukrainian language and Ukraine’s national unity even 
before the turbulent events of 2013–2014: debates on the status of Russian as a 
potential second state language continued through the presidencies of the 2000s, 
fuelling political polarisation4. In 2012, during the presidency of Viktor 
Ianukovych, the Parliament adopted a new version of the ‘Bases of the state 
language policy’ law, as a result of which Russian became a second official 
language (used in public affairs, education etc.) in 18 regions of Ukraine5. 
                                                                        
4  Poltavec (2017) The Language Law. Social Communications Research Centre, accessed 
from: http://www.nbuviap.gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2753: 
movnij-zakon&catid=8&Itemid=350 





coup, fascist seige of 




During the conflict, the law received significant pushback: in 2017 a new draft 
bill (‘On state language’) was registered, which stated that the ‘…Ukrainian 
language is a decisive factor and the main identifier for the Ukrainian national 
identity which formed historically and has for many centuries existed on its 
ethnic territory…’6. This bill was not ratified; instead, as of April 2019, a new 
Language Law entered into force: its main provisions are the mandatory use of 
the Ukrainian language in all areas of the public sphere (public administration, 
the service sector, medicine etc.), and also at all levels of education and media 
(including online resources, printed media, cinema etc.)7. The Ukrainian 
Minister of Culture emphasised that ‘the question of the Ukrainian language is a 
question of everyday self-improvement, of forming one’s language identity’ and 
‘the Ukrainian language is one of the foundations of Ukrainian statehood’8.  
The rhetoric of these legislative acts shows the tension present in the public 
debate: the use of the Russian language in particular settings and the con-
sumption of Russian language media are framed as threats to Ukraine’s national 
identity, unity and, possibly, its sovereignty. The overall post-conflict normative 
context resulted in attempts to ‘roll back’ the spread of the Russian language in 
Ukraine and exclude it from life spheres deemed essential for the ‘integrity’ of 
national identity (public administration, education and media).  
Other aspects of the securitisation of the Russian language and Russian-
media consumption include banning more than 100 Russian TV and radio chan-
nels, series etc. since 2014, and a 2017 ban on the most widely used social 
network in Ukraine, the Russian-originVkontakte, on the search engine Yandex, 
on the server Mail.ru and on the social network Odnoklassniki (Sliesarieva, 
2020). Another legislative development that happened in the wake of the conflict 
and is now seen as a significant symbolic step away from Russia involves the 
‘De-Communisation Laws’ of 2015, which entailed the removal of Soviet-era 
memorials, renaming Soviet toponyms, and other prescriptive measures related 
to memorialising the Second World War, actions which run counter to the 
strictly prescribed Russian ‘Great Patriotic War’ narrative (Kozyrska, 2016). 
The narratives and communicative strategies accompanying the use of Russian 
media in the context of media bans in Ukraine are at the centre of Study III. 
What also reflects the essentialisation and securitisation of questions of 
identity, and specifically Ukrainian national identity, is the increased interest in 
sociological polls. The 2017 Gorshenin Institute’s poll was widely featured and 
celebrated in the media; its results showed that 92% of the population identified 
                                                                        
6  Проект Закону України ‘Про державну мову’ від 19 січ. 2017 р. № 5670. URL: 
http:// w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=60953  
7  Solonyna E. (2019) Radio Svoboda, accessed from:  
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29903678.html 
8  E.Nishiuk, 2019, in the communique reprinted by Radio Svoboda, accessed from: 
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29795878.html 
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as ‘ethnic Ukrainians’9. On the other hand, a 2016 poll of the Kyiv International 
Institute of Sociology reported its results on the same topic (‘what ethnicity do 
you identify with?’) by introducing categories of ‘monoethnic Ukrainians’, ‘bio-
ethnic Russo-Ukrainians’ and ‘monoethnic Russians’ (Куц, 2017) in an effort to 
make sense of existing hybridity in Ukraine. It doesn’t help that the Russian 
word natsionalnost can be understood as ethnicity and/or nationality. A general 
conclusion of a review of polls is that Ukrainian Russian-speakers are indeed 
‘shedding’ Russian identity and moving towards identifying with the national 
Ukrainian narrative (Kulyk, 2018). This only reflects the fact that boundaries 
between these two groups have been porous and mobile, so much so that certain 
populations have arguably shifted their identifications from one to another. 
To conclude, the above cited evidence suggests that several parallel pro-
cesses are taking place in post-2014 Ukraine: firstly, there are public level efforts 
to consolidate and formalise the Ukrainian national identity by appealing to some 
essentialist categories (e.g. language and history), which problematise the use of 
the Russian language and Russian media consumption in many life spheres. 
Secondly, public efforts to ‘make sense’, ‘name’ and reframe in more concrete 
terms and boundaries the ambivalent nature of Russian-speaking Ukrainians are 
taking place. Thirdly, a similar process of negotiation and re-conceptualisation 
of self-identities and boundaries is happening on the public level among 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians in response to comprehensive social change. 
 
 
2.2. Changes in the media system and status of  
the Russian language in Ukraine in the context of conflict 
The issue of media, language and its relation to identity in Ukraine remains 
contentious. On the one hand, following the annexation of Crimea and the 
outbreak of the conflict in the Donbass (2014), the public narratives of Ukraine 
and Russia became violently opposed to each other (Hutchings & Szostek, 
2015). This struggle manifested itself in the media-scape as well, with more 
than 100 Russian channels, TV and radio programmes, as well as the main social 
networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, the email service Mail.ru and the 
Yandex search – all of Russian origin – being banned in Ukraine in 2017 
(Sliesarieva, 2020).  
On the other hand, most of the banned sources are either available through 
satellite television (channels), the internet (films and TV series) or VPN services 
(platforms). Therefore, the resources were made less accessible, but not com-
pletely eliminated from the lives of the population. Table 1 summarises scattered 
data about media usage in Ukraine before and after the crisis erupted (2014) and 
the ban was introduced (2017). 
                                                                        
9  The ‘Ukrainian Society and European Values’ survey was conducted in April-May 2017 
by the Gorshenin Institute in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Ukraine 
and Belarus. Accessible at: https://www.unian.info/society/2208576-over-92-of-ukrainian-
citizens-consider-themselves-ethnic-ukrainians-survey.html  
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Table 1. Traditional and digital media in Ukraine 
Traditional media and general trends 
 BEFORE 2013–2014 
(CONFLICT) 
AFTER 2014 
Share of newspapers in the 
Russian language out of total 
newspaper circulation**** 
61.5% 61.5% 
Russian language magazines 
out of total magazine 
circulation**** 
85.6% (2014) 62.6% (2016) 
Russian language on leading 
TV channels, share of total air 
time**** 
50.3% (2013) 34.4% (2016) 
Digital media 
 BEFORE 2017 (BAN) AFTER 2017 
Users of Ukrainian internet 
(domain .ua), share of the 
general population* 
Approx. 23%;  
the Kyiv oblast is among 
the highest (60%), while 
among the lowest are the 
Donetsk obl. (5%) and 
Crimea (2.8%) (2009) 
64.7% (2017)* 
Russian origin websites in the 
Top 10 most popular resources 
in Ukraine** 
3–4 Russian resources –
Vkontakte (#2), Yandex 
Ukraine (#5), 
Odnoklassniki (#7), 
Mail.ru (#8) – 2016 ** 
1 Russian resource – 
Vkontakte (#4) (2018)*** 
Vkontakte coverage of 
Ukrainian internet (domain .ua) 
50% of users** 30.8% of users**** 
Odnoklassniki coverage of 
Ukrainian internet (domain .ua) 
22.3% of users** 17% of users**** 
Interface language in Facebook 
among Ukrainian users 
 75% – Russian language 
19% – Ukrainian language  
6% – Other 
(2016)** 
Share of population using 
Vkontakte (monthly) as of 2017 
 Approx. 33% ***** 
*Association of Ukrainian Internet 2018,  
**Les Belyi (2016) Ukrainian language online  
***Alexa rating for 500 Top websites 
****Taras Shamaida (2016) – Yearly monitoring of the Ukrainian language 
*****TNS Ukraine 2018 
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Overall, the role of the Russian language has been diminishing in the media 
scape, but not drastically. Some Russian resources have lost their share of cover-
age due to the ban; on the other hand, the spheres of entertainment, consump-
tion and communication are still dominated by the Russian language. In spite of 
restrictions, a third of the Ukrainian internet users still access VKontakte 
monthly10. The Russian language still plays a significant role in the Ukrainian 
digital media sphere, which means that, despite the conflict with Russia, the 
socio-technical system still supports hybrid and heterogeneous media practices. 
The impact of these hybrid practices (and hybridity in general) on the narratives 
and performances of national and civic identity is what drives my investigation 
into the media practices of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Study III. I inter-
pret changes in the media landscape as shifts in the normative and institutional 
context, and in the configuration and systems of the reproduction of practices 
that themselves lead to the emergence of new practices, new configurations and, 
hence, new norms (Shove et al., 2015). Study III examines the tension created 
by clashes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ practices and how they are interpreted in the 
changed normative context. 
To focus on the topic of identifications and interaction between various con-
cepts on the ground level in different regions in Ukraine, and in the changed 
social and media context, I provide an overview of the previous research on the 
topic of Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ identity, and outline possible improve-
ments in terms of conceptual lenses used to investigate the subject.  
 
 
2.3. Changing conceptualisations of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians’ identity 
Ukrainian identity building and the role of Russian-speakers in this process is a 
topic that aroused interest among scholars after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(in the mid-1990s), and again after the events of 2013–2014. At the same time, 
this scholarly interest sometimes produced conflicting results, and the whole 
picture of Russian-speakers’ identity – vis-a-vis identity-building in inde-
pendent Ukraine – remains rather blurred. 
The most important factor to take into account, before approaching the 
literature on Ukrainian identity building, is that the way Ukrainian identity is 
performed in the Ukrainian context at times challenges the clear distinction 
between ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Russian’ often presupposed by Western scholars 
studying nation-building and ethnic relations in the post-Soviet region. Ref-
lecting the interchangeable use of two languages in everyday life, and, prior to 
the conflict, the abundance of strong regional and local identifications, the 
                                                                        
10  Reported by hromadske.ua for June 2017, compared to 76% of users for May 2017 
(before restrictions were introduced). Accessed from: https://hromadske.ua/posts/tri-roki-
bez-vkontakte-skilki-ukrayinciv-use-she-koristuyutsya-socmerezhami-rf  
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Ukrainian context and its identity practices require a more nuanced approach 
(Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008; Janmaat, 2007; Kulyk, 2001).  
The situation of Russian-speakers cannot be understood outside of the 
Ukrainian nation-building context. Wolczuk (2000) demonstrates that while the 
majority of scholars treat the Ukrainian identity nexus as a simple division into 
a Ukrainian ‘majority’ and Russian-speaking ‘minority’, the truth is that neither 
group is homogeneous. By the early 1990s, three groups emerged: Ukrainian-
speaking Ukrainians (44%), Russian-speaking Ukrainians (30%) and Russians 
(22%) (Wolczuk, 2000). But this, to complicate the situation even further, does 
not take into account completely bilingual Ukrainians or Russified Ukrainian-
speakers. Linguistic and cultural borders between Ukrainians and Russians be-
came extremely permeable, and, at the same time, arguably, no self-aware groups 
of Ukrainophones or Russophones emerged (Wolczuk, 2000). Additionally, 
being part of the Soviet Union ‘diluted’ the Ukrainian national idea and replaced 
it with the narrative of a ‘common statehood of Russia and Ukraine (Rus)’, 
which led to the fact that, despite successfully gaining independence, the 
Ukrainian population arguably failed to produce a strong sense of ‘imagined 
community’, at least in the period of the 1990s–2000s (Shevel, 2002; Wolczuk, 
2000).  
Other scholars have addressed the power structure of identities and language 
use in Ukraine, which also reflects the complex situation of Ukrainian nation-
building. For more than two decades of independence, the Russian language has 
remained the ‘language of convenience’ and everyday communication, while 
Ukrainian has been the ‘language of defiance’ (Wylegała, 2010). Bilaniuk & 
Melnyk (2008) note that Ukrainian is still seen sometimes as a ‘backward’ lan-
guage of peasants, with the majority of big cities being dominated by Russian, 
and the pressure to conform to Russian being especially strong in the workplace. 
Ryabchouk (1999) added to this picture by stating that Ukrainian Russian-
speakers usually are quite supportive of Ukrainian nationhood and territorial 
integrity, but resent the enforced use of the Ukrainian language and culture. 
This explains the difference in national poll results (2017), as people may change 
their identifications (Ukrainian and/or Russian) depending on the way the 
question is asked.  
The most recent pre-conflict investigation of identity narratives in Ukraine 
was made by Korostelina (2013): she looked into the political elite visions of 
Ukrainian national identity and identified five separate narratives: (1) dual 
identity, (2) being pro-Soviet, (3) a fight for Ukrainian identity, (4) a recogni-
tion of Ukrainian identity, and (5) a multicultural-civic concept. The main 
points of contention among the narratives (excluding the civic one) was the 
question of how much salience should be given to the common Ukrainian-
Russian heritage (Kievan Rus), what the main difference between Ukraine and 
Russia is, and how much of the Russian language should be permitted into the 
public sphere (Korostelina, 2013). 
An apparent shift in approaching the question of Russian-speakers’ identities 
in Ukraine occurred after the start of the conflict in 2014. A study by Kulyk 
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(2017) proposed that ‘the link between identity and language has been broken’ 
for Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Kulyk (2014), in his explorations of narratives 
of Ukrainian nationalism in 2013–2014, underscored its deeply inclusive nature 
and the embracing of Russian-speaking citizens. He further proceeded to 
conclude that now the border between Ukrainian and Russian identities is not 
linguistic/ethnic, but political: despite the deep alienation of Ukrainian Russian-
speakers (which constitute, depending on the definition, up to 40% of the popu-
lation) from the Russian people and Russia as a state, they continue to use 
Russian in everyday life, while still being loyal to Ukrainian nationhood (Kulyk, 
2014). Kulyk, as well as other scholars, has devoted significant attention to 
understanding whether the foundation of the post-2014 Ukrainian identity is 
ethnic or civic. Quantitative (a 2015 survey) and qualitative (focus groups) 
research has demonstrated that the salience of the Ukrainian national identity 
became stronger (as opposed to other identities), and the embrace of state 
nationalism (symbols, etc.) grew, but the narratives accompanying these pro-
cesses were deeply conflicting (pride vs. helplessness) (Kulyk, 2016, 2017). A 
recent study on the narratives of war and the credibility of news in Ukraine 
demonstrated that the population is still divided by opposing narratives (pro-
Ukraine vs. pro-Russia) and, with the trust in news being very low, the support 
for these narratives depends not on diverse media practices, but on prior 
identifications (Szostek, 2017).  
Other recent studies (Kulyk, 2017, 2018) on the narratives of Ukrainian-ness 
and identifications of Russian-speakers demonstrated that while the most 
widespread definition of ‘what it means to be Ukrainian’ is the one based on 
citizenship, the percentage of people choosing ‘both Ukr/Rus’ as their natio-
nality reaches up to 20% in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. 
Knott (2018), in her discussion of peripheral, ‘borderline’ regions of Ukraine, 
suggests that the same questions mentioned above did not – up until 2014 and 
the conflict-induced polarisation – actually matter to the people living there. 
Knott’s (2018) proposition is that it was possible for the residents of peripheral 
regions (Crimea and the Donbas) to think of themselves as belonging to both 
‘Ukraine’ and ‘Russia’ at the same time: in other words, the categories of 
Ukrainian and Russian nationalities were not mutually exclusive before 2014. 
Based on the example of Crimea, Knott (2018) suggested that the reason for this 
collapse of symbolic boundaries was the fact that Ukrainians and Russians 
could effectively behave as common actors in the peripheral regions, and did 
not encounter in their everyday life situations that encouraged them to perform 
their nationality.  
But beginning in 2013–2014 researchers assume that the situation became 
more complex. On one hand, hybridity practices are supported by a proliferation 
of multiple ambivalent identities among titular Ukrainians (‘Western-Ukrainian’, 
‘Eastern-Ukrainian’, ‘Russian’, ‘Soviet’, ‘European’, ‘Slavic’, regional and city 
identities, all of them fused and distributed to various degrees across the popu-
lation) (Rodgers, 2006). On the other hand, after the events of 2014, a common 
understanding is that Ukraine has been undergoing national consolidation, and 
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also that it has become a field of struggle between two competing nationalisms: 
Ukrainian Nationalism vs. East Slavic Nationalism (Kuzio, 2015b). Janmaat & 
Piattoeva (2007) noted that even in the 2000s tension was building up between 
discourses of civic citizenship, perpetuated by international organisations, and 
national consolidation in Ukraine and Russia. In addition, the deep crisis in 
relations between Ukraine and Russia suggests that a widespread hybridity of 
identification (‘Ukraine as the Motherland and Russia as the Fatherland’) is not 
supported any more by both societies’ frameworks and, in fact, even the pre-
crisis development of both countries was characterised by policies essentialising 
their division (K. Korostelina, 2011; Petro, 2014).  
An exploration of the scholarly debate around Ukrainian and Russian-
speaking Ukrainian identity uncovers tensions between Western narratives of 
nation building and civic engagement and the challenges of their application to 
post-Soviet states, especially to Ukraine. On one hand, after the interrupted 
nation-building of the Soviet era, many authors approve of national identity 
consolidation efforts, and see it as necessary for Ukraine’s future. In these 
instances, Russian-speakers are often separated into a more distinct group, and 
resistance to accepting Ukrainian linguistic and cultural practices is emphasised. 
On the other hand, the current Western multiculturalist narratives lean more 
toward highlighting the inclusive, civic bases of national identity. When these 
lenses are applied to Ukraine, the fragmented nature of Russian-speakers’ 
identities and the multiple and porous boundaries between groups are brought to 
light. Most recently, it seems, Ukrainian (Kulyk, 2017, 2018; Kuzio, 2015b) 
scholars have focused on re-incorporating Russian-speaking Ukrainians as a 
group into the national identity narrative and have, to some degree, attempted to 
de-securitise the issue of the Russian language. Other authors (e.g. Knott, 2018; 
and K. V. Korostelina, 2013) have taken a more constructivist view of the topic 
of Ukrainian identity performances and narratives, but have not engaged with 
specific popular constructions, or with their ontological elements, which I 




3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Identity and ontological narratives 
The concept that unites various elements of this study, as well as broadly 
informing engagement with the topic of group boundaries, loyalties and com-
munication practices of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the conflict setting, 
is identity, as understood by the constructivist school of thought. When first 
introduced, the concept of identity was predominantly seen in primordial terms, 
as something set, self-evident and natural, stemming from regional differences 
and properties of locations (Jones, 1997; A. D. Smith, 1979, 1986, 1995, 1996, 
1999; Stryker & Burke, 2000). The rise of constructivism shed a different light 
on the issues of ethnos and identity, arguing that both are more concerned with 
the representations and performances of ethnicity and connections to ‘imagined’ 
ethnic communities, rather than ethnic origin as such (Alba, 1990; Anderson, 
2006; Gellner, 2008; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Moreover, identity is not only 
constructed and later performed by individuals, it also reflects complex hier-
archies of status existing in societies at large. Claiming identification with a 
group and ascribing such identifications to others signify that there is social or 
political capital to be gained (Sen, 2007; Waters, 1990). Likewise, changes in 
identifications can result from new governmental policies, an increase in 
activism and other social changes (Nagel, 1994).  
I strongly agree with Brubaker’s critique of the academic use of the concept 
of identity that despite the increase of constructivism in identity literature, in the 
majority of particular studies identity is still treated as something fixed and 
almost inescapable (Brubaker, 2004). The most common mistake of identity 
scholars (and, by extension, politicians) is seeing stable clear-cut groups where 
in reality there are none, or at least where more complicated mechanisms are 
operating, e.g. group dynamics, the influence of different discursive frames etc. 
(Brubaker, 2004). Thus, I share a post-modern take on the category of identity, 
which revolves around deconstructing discourses attached to the notion itself, 
especially to the fact that collective identities, especially ethnic ones, became a 
public matter (Sen, 2007; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Manipulation of the dis-
course surrounding ethic identities is often linked to the interests of elites: the 
stakes they have in building the image of the Other and perpetuating the idea of 
a homogeneous nation (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 2008). 
This research engages with the processes of identity formation in a turbulent 
social context. Though it is generally agreed that identities are fluid and always 
in the process of negotiation, there is also an understanding that social change 
(e.g. war or colonisation) and ruptures to societal tissue produce immense impacts 
on identities, narratives (the stories groups tell about themselves and others), 
boundaries and performances. This is true for Ukraine in two ways: firstly, it is 
a country in a state of military conflict with a neighbouring state, but secondly, 
and more generally, it is a country with a Soviet legacy. Nationalism, as practised 
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by ‘new’ (post-communist) European states, has been viewed as a controversial, 
potentially dangerous phenomenon by scholars for some time. Although A. D. 
Smith (1999) has suggested that each new state has to undergo a phase of 
national consolidation, R. Brubaker has famously coined the term ‘nationalizing 
states’: states that in the process of active nation-building get inescapably 
trapped in the vicious cycle of accusatory rhetoric between constructed ‘minority 
groups’ and external homelands (Brubaker, 1995; Kuzio, 2002). More critical 
researchers, e.g. Wimmer & Glick Schiller (2002), suggest that this only shows 
how ubiquitous, invisible and self-explanatory the idea of a nation and having 
stable clear-cut national identities, especially in the Western sense, have 
become. The concept of a national identity, nationalising policies and the image 
of a ‘proper’ nation state have not only been forced upon societies undergoing 
social change, but have also been internalised by them (Wimmer & Glick 
Schiller, 2002).  
Engagement with the topic of identity in Ukraine and other post-Soviet 
societies has largely followed the same structuralist tradition (Arel, 2018; 
Onuch et al., 2018; Onuch & Hale, 2018). This research aims to address the fact 
that the topic of national identity in Ukraine has been addressed from ahistorical 
and essentialising positions, assuming experiences with national and ethnic 
categories similar to those in Western societies. Conversely, I propose to 
approach the topic from the ontological narrativity perspective outlined by 
Somers & Gibson (1993), offering a new perspective on the change in cultural 
order and the regime of everyday normalities in Ukrainian society.  
Somers and Gibson’s (1993) call for the re-conceptualisation of identity 
studies is rather general, but it serves to support the underlying bases of my 
research. Somers and Gibson (1993, p. 13) advocate uniting identity formation 
studies with the sociology of action by ‘historicising’, situating in particular 
historical circumstances the core concepts of sociology, such as agency and 
identity, and diverting the attention of sociologists back to narratives. Further-
more, they call for ‘normalising’ the study of identity in the ontological sense, 
advocating that ‘we must reject the decoupling of action from ontology, and 
instead accept that some notion of social being and social identity is, willy-nilly, 
incorporated into each and every knowledge-statement about action, agency, 
and behaviour’ (Somers and Gibson, 1993, p. 4). 
Following their suggestions, I study identity and narratives in relation to 
very universal categories, such as time, space and relationality (in addition to 
class, gender and race) and focus on the ‘narrativist understanding of social 
action and social agency – one that is temporal, relational, and cultural, as well 
as institutional, material, and macro-structural’ (Somers and Gibson, 1993, p. 5). I 
adopt their notion that the main categories for sociological analysis, agency, 
structure, identity etc., ‘…rest on the core of a historical “metanarrative” of 
classical western modernization …’, and social theory in itself, by presuming 
about questions that need to be answered by studies of identity, nation, etc. inter-
venes in the narrative process of knowledge construction (Somers and Gibson, 
1993, p. 10). Thus, in general, I support the authors’ call to de-abstract the 
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identity of the subject and re-settle it back in the particular time, social relations, 
institutional practices and collective memory that posed the question, in other 
words to explore identity ‘empirically and historically’ (Somers and Gibson, 
1993, p. 25).  
This is especially important for the context of this research and the identity-
ontological challenges faced by the Ukrainian population with the necessity of 
responding to and negotiating the ahistorical essentialisation of the language in 
the context of conflict. This research can, in turn, be informative in helping 
social scientists today approach the intricacies of identity transformation while 
avoiding abstracting the categories of agency and identity and conceptualising 
them as ‘deviant’ in relation to systemic change. My research looks into how 
subjects maintain ontological integrity and security by performing agency in 
mundane everyday acts in a particular historical context and, therefore, con-
tributes to the development of the historical-ontological analysis of social change.  
At the core of the investigation of identity in the ontological sense is the 
focus on ontological narratives. Somers & Gibson (1993) talk about four levels 
of narrativity: public narratives, conceptual narratives, metanarratives and 
ontological narratives (pp. 30–33). The latter, also known as personal narratives, 
are ‘stories that social actors use […] to make sense of their lives’ (Somers & 
Gibson, 1993, p. 30). Ontological narratives connect life events, using different 
narrativity features to embed ‘the identity and the self in time and spatial 
relations’ (p. 30). Ontological narratives exist on an inter-personal level (p. 31), 
but they are sustained and eventually transformed in the framework of larger 
webs of relationality and meanings, which Somers & Gibson (1993, p. 31) 
define as public narratives, of which the national identity narrative is one. 
The conceptualisation of ontological narratives that are at the centre of this 
research also follows Somers and Gibson’s (1993) line of thinking, defining 
four features of reframed narrativity: ‘1) relationality of parts, 2) causal emplot-
ment, 3) selective appropriation, and 4) temporality, sequence, and place.’(1993, 
p. 27). In other words, ontological narratives work by connecting some parts 
(selective appropriation) of constructed configuration and/or networks of prac-
tices (relationality), giving symbolic significance to these connections (emplot-
ment) and positioning them in chronological order (temporality, sequence and 
place). I pay specific attention, following Somers and Gibson’s (1993, p. 28) 
thought, to how ‘narrativity’ turns ‘events’ into abstracted episodes selected on 
some value-based prioritisation, whether or not the sequence of episodes is 
presented or experienced in anything resembling chronological order (emplot-
ment and selective appropriation).  
To conclude, the ontological narrativity perspective informs my general 
approach to the study of identity and narratives in a particular historical context 
(Ukraine and conflict). However, I supplement this general foundation with 
some additional concepts and perspectives that help flesh out particular aspects 
of identity formation in social change and in a society where conceptualisations 
of ethnic and national identities have, until recently, been vague and blurred. To 
that end, I add the symbolic boundaries framework to outline the mechanism of 
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border(s) construction that play an important part in ontological narratives and 




3.2. Symbolic boundaries 
To continue in the constructivist tradition, I look at identity in the Ukrainian 
context through the lenses of symbolic boundaries, following Lamont’s con-
ceptualisation (Lamont, 1992). The original shift of focus from ‘cultural dif-
ferences’ as the most influential factors in defining ethnic identities, to borders 
between groups and nations (Barth, 1969) signified an early shift from a struc-
turalist to a constructivist understanding of identity (Eriksen, 2019). Barth’s 
famous essay on ‘Ethnic groups and boundaries’ conceptualises the (re)pro-
duction of ethnic groups and ethnic identity as an ongoing process of boundary-
making that proceeds in inter-group communication. Therefore, he sees ethnic 
and national identity as a culturally rather enduring (but not pre-established) 
phenomenon emerging and changing in the course of negotiation and interaction 
between group members and groups. 
Though Barth (1969) was the first to conceptualise ethnicity borders and the 
interactional ontology of ethnic identities, his general treatment of the subject 
was still more ‘naturalist’, as Eriksen (2019) posits: for him borders and dif-
ferent ethnic groups exist as a result of a common universal human feature to 
draw distinctions and, therefore, all borders are of a similar nature and thus 
comparable (Barth, 1969). The borders between groups are permeable, but the 
mechanism of differentiation and border creation remains discrete (Barth, 1969; 
Eriksen, 2019).  
However, this study posits that the process of border construction and nego-
tiation reveals more about the dynamic of relations between groups and states 
than just investigating where the borders lie, which is why I apply Lamont’s 
(1992) conceptualisation of symbolic borders. She connected several aspects 
from the works of Durkheim ([1912]1965), Weber (1922) and Bourdieu (1984) 
on distinctions and groups: while for Durkheim (1912) symbolic distinctions 
between the sacred and profane functioned as unifying factors to create 
cohesive societies (Lamont et al., 2015), for Weber (1922) and Bourdieu (1984) 
they act as instruments for creating social inequality between classes, where 
‘cultural understandings about state boundaries have a strong impact on a 
person’s social position and access to resources’ (Lamont et al., 2015, pp. 850–
851).  
So, building on those interpretations, Lamont defines symbolic boundaries as 
‘the lines…that include some people…while excluding others’ through various 
mechanisms, institutions and everyday practices, to ultimately create a con-
structed unity and/or to perpetuate inequality (Lamont, 1992; Lamont et al., 
2015; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). According to Lamont (1992), they not only 
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help us understand and ‘map’ the outside world, but also serve as anchors for 
our self-perception, reinforcing our own identifications.  
So, Barth stressed the interactional nature of identity and encouraged focusing 
on the processes and phenomena of interaction in researching identity and its 
transformation (instead of the study of such objective structural factors as 
mobility). Lamont (1992), in her work on ‘symbolic’ and ‘social’ boundaries, 
elaborated on Barthian views in order to balance the agency-structure role. 
Lamont has principally explained how the identity contributes through boundary-
work to social structuration (in the Giddensian sense). In her work, there exist 
not only ‘symbolic boundaries’ that are distinctions between social groups 
defined by actors, but also ‘social boundaries’ that are structurally prescribed 
unequal affordances and accesses to resources and opportunities (Lamont & 
Molnár, 2002). Symbolic boundaries are necessary factors in propelling social 
change, but only when they are widely accepted within a society. Only then are 
they able to initiate relevant changes to structure and became structurally 
embedded social boundaries.  
According to these concepts, the situation in Ukraine is about change in not 
only symbolic boundaries, but also in social boundaries, because the access to 
resources (e.g. media and other limitations concerning language use) and social 
and political capital (the ability to influence public discourse, propose legis-
lation, or even vote in the case of internally displaced persons) has been limited 
in specific ways during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russian-speakers face the 
problem of shifting a part of their everyday habits out of the legitimate regime 
of practices in the context of the Russian invasion and the re-definition of 
symbolic boundaries that may also bring about the danger that they transform 
into structurally supported social boundaries. Their management of symbolic 
boundaries and media and language use habits is critical (although the reactions 
of ethnic Ukrainians are also important) in deciding the formation of social 
boundaries in the new Ukraine. 
Symbolic boundaries between ‘national’ spaces are arguably ‘thicker’ than 
other group boundaries, and modern societies are grounded in the national frame-
work (Gellner, 2008), to the point where the category of nation has become 
ubiquitous and ‘invisible’ in research (Modarres, 2005). The borders between 
nations are not just objects in themselves; they reflect the power dynamics 
between and within states, shaping internal social practices and structuring 
interactions between individuals and groups (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). ‘National 
identity’ and its borders, in this sense, becomes an arena of struggle for power 
and control between competing discourses, while at the same time remaining an 
instrument of manipulation (Iedema, 1997; Iedema & Wodak, 1999; Muntigl et 
al., 2000). 
The struggle inherent in the concept of national identity and symbolic 
borders manifests itself through various life spheres, of which language is one. 
‘Language as a social practice’, as defined by Fairclough, (1995) and Fair-
clough & Wodak (1997), as well as the extra-linguistic context, are crucial in 
analysing ideological effects of practised discursive power relations (Wodak & 
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Meyer, 2001). Even mundane everyday acts of communication, which are a part 
of the focus of this research, are not only themselves products of specific 
societal conditions, but also dynamically uphold, shape and re-shape them. In 
the process of communicating, subjects construct or defy the existing symbolic 
order, and also determine their own positions in relation to it (Wodak, 2009).  
In the case of Ukraine and Russia, as pointed out by Teper (2016) and Kuzio 
(2015b), an active re-negotiation of the national identity narratives is taking 
place. The power struggle in the identity construction in Ukraine and Russia 
concerns many spheres: ensuring support from various internal (and external) 
populations in the context of a military conflict, delineating, in fact, which 
populations are internal and which are external (e.g. Crimean inhabitants and 
dwellers of separatist-controlled regions in the Donbass), upholding/unsettling 
the symbolic hierarchy of the post-Soviet space (where Russia is usually seen as 
a ‘strong actor’, while Ukraine is a ‘failed state’), securing support from the 
West (in the Ukrainian case), etc.  
The re-negotiation of national identity is happening in the context of the 
transformation of previously ‘blurred’ group boundaries: as suggested by Shevel 
(2002), Wolczuk (2000) and, more recently, by Knott (2018), prior to 2014 con-
structions of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Russian’ identifications in the context of Ukrainian 
peripheries often overlapped, where in reality both categories collapsed and 
subjects acted as one. In addition, territorial, place-based identifications, 
especially in Crimea (Study I) and the eastern regions (Study II), have never 
lost their salience, although significant processes of de-terrorisation and politi-
sation have taken place. A growing number of recent studies also support the 
assumption that Ukrainian public sphere actors have been active in reshaping 
the public identity discourse and in re-drawing the lines between what it means 
to be Ukrainian and Russian, as well as the imagined inter-relationship between 
the two communities (Kulyk, 2016, 2017, 2018; Kuzio, 2015a).  
In the case of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, there was little effort to critically 
engage with the border-negotiation efforts. Even now, with the majority of 
scholars attempting to define new ways of operationalising ethnicity and identity 
in the Ukrainian context, the main focus still remains on finding the causal 
relationships between language/ethnicity and support for various policies (Arel, 
2018; Onuch & Hale, 2018).  
The aim of this research is to investigate the issue of border-construction and 
border-negotiation strategies in Ukraine, as performed by the Russian-speaking 
populations, in the turbulent social context. Even though it is assumed that 
identities and borders are in constant flux, an additional challenge is to incorpo-
rate the impact of a sudden social change and its possible implications into the 
development of the national identity narrative, which I address by including the 





3.3. Cultural Trauma 
Cultural trauma is a concept introduced to post-communist studies by Sztompka 
(2000a), though it was previously extensively used in anthropology and memory 
studies (Alexander, 2004; Alexander et al., 2004; Caruth, 2016; Eyerman, 2001). 
Cultural trauma is conventionally understood as a phenomenon of an under-
mined sense of commonality reflected in a unified narrative, which usually 
follows a subjectively (culturally) disruptive event or process (Sztompka 2000a, 
p. 452; Alexander et al. 2004, p. 29). Sztompka suggests that any social change, 
especially a rapid and unexpected one, creates a ‘rip’ in the tissue of collectivity 
of a given society, and any breakdown of a current cultural order is accom-
panied by ‘disturbances in collective identity’, ‘identity crisis’ and attempts to 
‘re-establish, reshape and construct a new collective identity’ (Sztompka 2000a, 
p. 459).  
The use of the term trauma requires criteria as to what events can qualify as 
socially/culturally traumatic. My use of it in this research study, and particularly 
in the case of the annexation of Crimea, requires some explanation as well. The 
definition depends on the approach a researcher takes. At first, she can see 
trauma as a dire consequence of a potentially collectively traumatising event 
seen from the ‘objective’ perspective and perceiving the victims of trauma as 
being passive (Neal, 1998). Secondly, trauma can be conceptualised as a response 
to those potentially traumatising events and victims as active agents. Thirdly, 
trauma can be seen as a social space where coping with horrible events happens, 
whether constructively (leading to re-adaptation into society) or non-con-
structively (falling out of societal frameworks) (Caruth, 2016). Fourthly, trauma 
can be conceptualised as a claim that is made by a group in a society, a process 
of establishing victimhood and blaming perpetrators, and thus, in the end, it is a 
specific narrative shared by a community that plays a role in a public discourse 
(Alexander, 2004; Sztompka, 2000b, 2000a). Both Sztompka and Alexander 
contend that cultural trauma constitutes a disruption of the cultural foundation 
not only at the ideological level, but also at the level of norms, i.e. taken-for-
granted ways of doing and thinking, when routinised behaviours become 
uncertain and hostile (Alexander, 2004; Sztompka, 2004). The important dif-
ference between Sztompka and Alexander is that for Sztompka cultural traumas 
are caused by external events that break social actors’ routines, taken-for-
granted beliefs and habits, i.e. ‘dislocations in the routine, accustomed ways of 
acting or thinking’ (Sztompka, 2004, p. 164). In explaining the resources and 
mechanisms actors use to overcome traumatic events or periods in history and 
achieve a new stabilisation of the social order, Sztompkas’s approach is pre-
dominantly structuralist-functionalist.  
Alexander’s (2004, 2013) approach is instead constructivist, where trauma is 
not caused by the event but by how people interpret the event and narrate it, 
negotiating the tension between ‘old’ and ‘new’ narratives. While for Sztompka 
cultural trauma is about externally caused change in the ‘regime of practices’ 
(Brulle & Norgaard, 2019), for Alexander the trauma is about changed cultural 
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hegemony (Alexander, 2004). While I acknowledge and draw somewhat from 
Alexander’s (2004) definition, Sztompka’s (2000a) interpretation of the impact 
of rapid change on collective identity and societal development, which I use in 
my research, fits better with the symbolic boundaries framework, which 
Sztompka partially implemented in addressing the impact of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union on the changing identifications and symbolic borders between 
‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ Europe in Polish society (Sztompka, 1996, 2000b).  
His main interpretation of cultural trauma is that – whether outwardly 
interpreted as good or bad – all drastic social change produces cultural dis-
orientation and a collective search for new cultural orienteers, what can also be 
re-conceptualised in Somers’ and Gibson’s (1993) words as the re-establish-
ment of the subject’s ontological security through the re-invention of disrupted 
identity narratives that re-frame everything, from understandings of agency and 
identity to everyday mundane practices in that particular society. Sztompka’s 
treatment of the cultural trauma of social change as the physical-structural inter-
ruption of the existing social order is relevant, because the war with Russia 
transformed not only the political but also the economic, administrative, legal 
and media structures of Ukraine, not to mention the cultural hegemonies. The 
previous taken-for-granted institutional behaviour norms and practices have 
now been problematised in the course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the 
individual and collective agents that against the new norms are sanctioned (i.e. 
the ban on Russian media channels). Thus the pre-2013 practices and inter-
actions of the Ukrainian people that were formed as a result of their socialisa-
tion in the previous state of the social order came to be problematised, and their 
agency is becoming more institutionally prescribed/shaped (i.e. institutionalised 
and politicised). On the individual level, people who use the Russian language 
in certain social spheres and consume Russian media face both objective and 
perceived failures of everyday habitus. The perceived inadequacy of the habitus 
can lead to a number of possible individual responses (Sztompka 2004, p. 184–
188).  
According to Sztompka (2004), the ways of managing cultural trauma at the 
institutional and individual levels can be aimed both at achieving a change in 
the social order and at the maintenance of the old order, i.e. social inertia 
(Sztompka, 2004, p. 194). Individuals may or may not change habits and modify 
their self-identifications, institutions can support or hinder new and old social 
practices, and social movements carrying relevant ideas may or may not 
emerge. The social groups and institutions who are adherents of ‘new’ (i.e. those 
changing their media routines because of the ban) or ‘old’ cultural practices (i.e. 
those who continue the same routines of consuming Russian media) create 
tensions and clashes between themselves that, in turn, lead to changes in the 
whole cultural order of the given society and result in cultural transformation 
(Sztompka, 2004, p. 194). 
Thus, in spite of having immediate negative consequences, cultural trauma 
can be a force for social becoming and can act as a catalyst for social con-
solidation or re-construction (Sztompka, 2000a, p. 464). I assume, following 
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this interpretation, that the disruption of existing ontological narratives can lead 
to the re-negotiation of identity elements and border configurations that were 
too radical before to be accepted by the public discourse.  
I consider some of the criticism expressed by Kansteiner (2004) regarding the 
category of cultural trauma to be legitimate: he notes that it fetishises violence 
(by not explicitly differentiating between victims and perpetrators), diminishes 
real trauma (e.g. that of the Holocaust and slavery, from which this area of 
studies originated) and borrows too much from the psychology of individual 
trauma. I consider this criticism more relevant to previous works on collective 
trauma (e.g. Caruth 1996 and Neal 1998), while Sztompka, in his treatment of 
the concept, clearly makes a connection with the well-established tradition of 
studying the effects of social change on the societal level: Durkheim’s (1897) 
anomie, Ogburn & Duncan’s (1964) cultural lag, identity crisis literature (Merton, 
1938), etc.  
I assume that the event that arguably kicked off the processes of identity 
transformation – the Crimean annexation in its conjunction with the Revolution 
of Dignity (Studies I and II) – can be interpreted through the lens of the cultural 
trauma theory (Sztompka, 2000a), assuming that it acted as a disruptor for the 
various Ukrainian communities (especially given Knott’s (2018) suggestion that 
the peripheral Ukrainian communities in Crimea and the east supported double/ 
overlapping Ukrainian/Russian identities before the start of the conflict). Using 
narrative analysis and the assumption of Somers and Gibson (1993) that 
narratives are employed to restore subjects’ ontological security in the event of 
disruption, I analysed the ways Crimean residents narrated the annexation to 
understand how the rapid political change prompted local residents to re-con-
struct their understanding of the self and their connection to imagined national 
communities through narratives, as well as how these narratives tied in with the 
larger national identity discourse changes in Ukraine and Russia (Study I). On 
an individual level, applying Sztompka’s concept made it possible to see the 
construction of alternative victim-perpetrator narratives that served as a basis 
for the new national identities that the Russian-speaking Ukrainian subjects had 
to adopt to re-root their understandings of themselves in the new social reality. 
The physical shifting of borders in Ukraine, which was largely interpreted as an 
act of violence, created the need for a re-conceptualisation of symbolic borders 
between the two states and various overlapping groups. 
 
 
3.4. Transnationalisation of the bordered space 
While the concepts of symbolic boundaries and cultural trauma provide an 
almost complete lens to investigate changes in identity construction in the post-
conflict space in Ukraine, one aspect requires additional discussion and con-
ceptualisation. With the start of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, national 
borders shifted both physically and symbolically and, arguably, became less 
permeable. Where before group identities collapsed and people didn’t encounter 
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borders on an everyday basis (Knott, 2018), suddenly they not only had to inter-
act with state borders much more often (e.g. in the case of Crimean residents or 
internally displaced persons, by travelling across contested borders), but also 
faced securitisation of their previously ordinary practices, e.g. speaking Russian, 
consuming Russian-language media or having hybrid identifications. As before 
the borders were not emphasised, practices of a trans-border nature were ‘invis-
ible’, while now that the existence of borders is actively communicated, people 
have to, as part of the re-negotiation of identifications in the context of social 
change, make sense of their individual trans-border practices.  
Sztompka (2000a) emphasised that constructive coping with cultural trauma 
happens when collective identity is re-constructed using a narrative that alleviates 
inconsistencies, when a new clear interpretation is offered. However, in the 
globalised world, processes of nationalisation and transnationalisation exist side 
by side, and their interaction in the Ukrainian case is what makes the puzzle so 
complex. Study III, while building on the findings of Studies I and II, 
approaches changes in online media practices caused by the conflict-induced 
polarisation from the perspective of transnationalism, and how engaging in 
consuming media that comes from abroad and/or challenges the existing state 
narrative potentially either works to de-construct the notion of nationality or, in 
the context of the conflict, to produce a more inclusive civic narrative of the 
national identity. 
There is a large body of literature that explores the impact of globalisation 
on the nation state and its institutions (e.g. Albrow, 1997; Carnoy, 2001; Carnoy 
& Castells, 2001; Sassen, 1996; Vertovec & Cohen, 2002). The authors’ pre-
sumption is that while borders become more permeable and mobility grows, 
national identity and the power of state institutions wither (Vertovec, 2001). 
However, this is contested by many national identity/nationalism scholars, who, 
while acknowledging that the institutional frameworks might be changing, point 
out how our personal identifications and views on how world politics works are 
still deeply rooted in the idea of the nation state (e.g. Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 
2002).  
One of the attempts to understand how the nation state reacts to the trans-
nationalisation of identities is through the dynamic nexus of ‘identities-borders-
orders’ (Albert et al., 2001). According to the authors, any given nation state 
seeks to ‘contain’ the people within its territory (borders), and impose its insti-
tutions (order) and identity on them. Mobility challenges all three aspects of the 
nexus and disturbs the common narrative of the ‘uninterruptedness’ of the 
national identity (Vertovec, 2004).  
However, more recent studies in the field show a shift in the understanding 
of transnationalism as something new and external to the state, something that 
happens to the state and is driven by migrants in a traditional sense. Grzymala-
Kazlowska & Phillimore (2018) note that migration studies, despite often using 
transnationalism as their framework, have retained a clear national focus; for 
many years the interaction between migrants/minority groups, the home state 
and the receiving state was at the centre of the debate (Parrado, 2017). The main 
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assumption is that migrants’ transnationalism is based on simultaneous engage-
ment in home and host countries, and can be both unbalanced and positively 
reinforcing of the host country’s social cohesion (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Tsuda, 
2012). The connection between citizenship and transnationalism, explored by 
such authors as Couldry et al. (2014), Lewicki (2017), Lewicki & O’Toole 
(2017) and Muller (2004), depicts how the discourse of civic activity is being 
reshaped by those holding multiple loyalties and identities. However, the main 
point is that these studies assume that there is a clear majority within the state to 
which the transnational minority does – or does not – assimilate; it is assumed 
that both a lack of assimilation and full assimilation affect the ‘core’ culture.  
However, the lens of transnationalism was subjected to critical reflection as 
soon as it was conceptualised. Vertovec (2007) called for abandoning the focus 
on a specific minority group’s engagement with the ‘home-country’ and focusing 
on the larger state of super-diversity. Super-diversity is the multidimensional 
complexity that occurs when different diversities (ethnic, legal, social, economic, 
political, religious etc.) intersect (Grillo, 2015). But if groups of populations 
become super-mobile, globalised and subject to these intersecting differences, 
the ensuing conclusion is that it is not only migrant communities, but in fact all 
communities, to a greater or lesser degree, that are profoundly affected by 
globalisation and are transnational in differing ways. Hence, in many cases 
there isn’t a coherent majority culture to which the minority should assimilate 
(Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018). In fact, the whole distinction 
between a minority/majority, us/them, sending/receiving state is missing the 
nuance of socio-economic, cultural and demographic complexity that exists in 
modern societies (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018). The recent 
transnational approach involves looking at practices that cross state borders and 
groups enacting them, taking into account the local context (Redclift & Rajina, 
2019), as well as levels of education, language, gender, legal status (in different 
combinations, individually/intersectionally) as expressions of social capital that 
group members may or may not have access to (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Philli-
more, 2018).  
 
 
3.5. Media use in practising transnationalism 
In the last couple of years, the main focus in transnationalism studies has firmly 
shifted to examining the interplay and mutual reinforcement of transnational 
practices and digital media. This came about as a result of understanding that 
new forms of media play an equal, or perhaps bigger, role in the lives of people 
with ‘multiple loyalties’, in comparison with mobility itself (Andersson, 2013).  
For that reason, online media, as an important vessel for national identity 
construction, is at the centre of Study III, following Anderson’s conceptualisa-
tion of nationhoods as ‘imagined communities’: common virtual constructs that 
unite people who otherwise don’t know each other through information-spreading 
technologies, state commemorative practices etc. (Anderson, 2006). However, 
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in the context of rising mobility, the porousness of borders/information, and the 
super-diversity discussed above (Vertovec, 2007), national identity narratives 
are becoming increasingly negotiable, and the negotiation happens in a space 
where physical borders are non-existent and multiple group identities have many 
more opportunities to engage in direct interactions. That’s why it’s assumed that 
media practices that are cross-border/hybrid in nature might lead to the 
loosening of identities and the construction of multiple identities that do not fit 
discourses perpetuated by respective nation states, and that, in fact, break out of 
the national framework (Aksoy & Robins, 2002; Vertovec, 2001). In Study III, 
I focused on how the national identity is being re-negotiated and reproduced via 
micro-level digital practices in the context of a hybrid media system, as well as 
under the influence of conflict-induced polarisation.  
The focus on practices fits well with my research’s overall concern with 
social change, as I follow the view of Shove et al. (2012) that systems of social 
practice ‘hold society together’ and are important objects of study in times of 
transition (p. 3), as practices are simultaneously shaped by the norms and 
institutions of a particular society and reproduce them, being both indicators and 
agents of change (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). For the purpose of investigating the 
behaviours outlined in Study III, I adopted Reckwitz’s (2002) definition of 
practice as a ‘routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, “things” and their use, a background knowledge in the form of 
understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge. A 
practice … depends on the existence and specific inter-connectedness of these 
elements, and … cannot be reduced to any one of these single elements’ 
(Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249). According to the social practices theory approach, 
social practices are collectively shared and recognisable entities (Shove et al., 
2012, 2015), and although individuals are carriers of practices in abstract terms, 
they perform them in their somewhat unique ways, and the practices vary 
according to situational contexts (Cetina et al., 2005; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki 
& Schatzki, 1996). Integrated elements of practices include material objects, 
visuals and skills, and are partly autonomous, partly constituted by all other 
practices which consist of the same elements (Shove et al., 2015). Social practices 
are reproduced by multiple circuits of reproduction, changing through new 
configurations formed as a result of new emerging forms of inter-dependence 
between elements, and co-requisite relationships between practices (Shove et 
al., 2012). Practices form bundles of practices (Schatzki, 2002). The lens of 
social practice theory enables one to analyse human actions in a comprehensive 
manner (both material and immaterial aspects) and in relation to the social 
structural context: not in a deterministic, but in a performative way that fits with 
the constructivist framework of this research. 
As regards social practices in the media domain, departing from the usual 
tradition of media content-centred research, I had to move away from media 
texts and instead focus on practices, or, ‘what are people actually doing in 
relation to media?’ (Couldry, 2012). Couldry created the concept and provided a 
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general definition of media-related practices as an ‘open-ended range of practices 
directly or indirectly related to, or oriented around media’ (Couldry, 2012, 
p. 33), but no practical mapping of media practices has been produced so far. 
The way people engage in and describe their practices can show larger patterns 
of power relations inside the society and competition between currently 
dominant narratives of ‘proper’ self-representation. Some researchers of digital 
transnationalism think that the internet does not function as a virtual space where 
people engage in cultural syncretism; rather, they see it as a deliberate tool used 
to create and share meaning (Skop & Adams, 2009). The practices associated 
with this ‘tool’ are therefore examined in Study III.  
The goal of the research and, in particular Study III, was to explore the 
dynamics of identity reproduction and re-negotiation through types of narration 
of media practices under conflict circumstances. The larger aim was to observe 
the interaction between transnational media practices and innovativeness: 
attempts to re-negotiate existing national identity narratives, practices and con-
ceptualisations of state institutions.  
For the purposes of the research, the transnational media practices are defined 
based on a more general tension outlined by Couldry (2012) between keeping 
channels open (hybridity/heterophily) and screening out (homophily), as 
engaging with/producing content and activities that originate from countries 
other than Ukraine or from occupied/uncontrolled territories (Crimea and parts 
of the Donbass), or which in any other way refer to ‘foreign’ elements in the 
public discourse of Ukraine. Transnational media/cultural practices (e.g. uniting 
elements of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Russian’, using languages interchangeably in 
creating posts, or bringing elements from the ‘other side’, e.g. pictures/news 
from occupied territories, into the discourse) can be considered to challenge the 
state narrative in the context of conflict and active nation-building. Homophily, 
conversely, is conceptualised as limiting engagement with cross-border and/or 
challenging content, as well as maintaining practices of engagement with homo-
geneous (in a cultural sense) content (e.g. unsubscribing from groups/content 
creators from Russia, switching to Ukrainian (the national language) in content 
creation etc.).  
The ‘allure of homophily’ (Gu et al., 2014) is that people often seek 
familiarity/reassurance through their online practices. On the other hand, 
researchers have consistently associated heterophily with civic engagement, and 
it is generally accepted that more diverse and issue-oriented media practices 
lead to higher levels of civic engagement (for an overview, see Gil de Zúñiga et 
al. (2012)). At the same time, it has been demonstrated that while transnational 
communities tend to construct their news consumption from multiple sources, 
‘like a puzzle’, this does not often lead to taking up alternative narratives 
(Szostek, 2017, 2018b, 2018a; Vihalemm & Juzefovičs, 2020). Therefore, the 
influence of the conflict context on the way users engage in and rationalise 
transnational media practices, as well as the impact of heterogeneity on the civic 
identity narrative, are examined in this research. 
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3.6. (Re)conceptualising Russian-speaking Ukrainians  
from the transnationalism perspective 
The theory of transnationalism has largely not been applied to hybrid popula-
tions of the post-Soviet space, especially Russian-speaking Ukrainians, before, 
as it mostly focused on groups traditionally viewed as engaging in regular trans-
national practices (i.e. remittances), such as Mexican migrants in the US, 
Vietnamese populations in Australia, Polish migrants in the UK etc. Vihalemm 
et al. (2019) and Vihalemm & Juzefovičs (2020) applied the transnational frame-
work extensively to Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia to see how residents 
(who often don’t have full legal status and are caught in between the political 
rhetoric of the European Union and Russia) engage in media practices that cross 
borders, and how this affects their identifications and views on citizenship. 
Following Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore (2018), Parrado (2017) and 
Redclift & Rajina (2019), I focus on specificities of the Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian group and the local and transnational contexts that define it, and how 
approaching it from a transnational perspective helps break out of the ‘methodo-
logical nationalism’ that dominates discussions of Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
identity, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002).  
Russian-speaking Ukrainians (together with Russian-speakers in Ukraine) 
are a diverse group formed not particularly as a result of distinct migration 
waves and policies of the Soviet Union (as is the case with Russian-speakers in 
Estonia and Latvia), but rather in a much lengthier process of cultural exchange 
and mutual influence across borders that have shifted over the course of several 
centuries. The history of both states is intertwined and full of problematic aspects 
in terms of memory politics (which go much further back than the recent violent 
crisis), which affect how the issue of the Russian language and culture is framed 
in the public debate.  
So, having that in mind and adding the element of an ongoing conflict, what 
propositions does the transnational framework have that are applicable to the 
case of Ukraine? Firstly, Però (2013) suggests that we should approach migrant 
practices, as well as their justification strategies, as reflections of state policies 
and narratives that can discursively include or exclude the migrant/minority 
group, absorbing instances of injustice. The local context, policies and narratives 
produce responses in hybrid groups that engage in transnational practices, but 
researchers’ views on these responses differ. Under the pressure of essentialising 
narratives, a hybrid group can fall back into transnational practices as a form of 
resistance: ‘reactive transnationalism’ (Redclift & Rajina, 2019). Kwok-Bun & 
Plüss (2013) further suggest differentiating between (innovative) migrant trans-
nationalism and (rebellious) migrant cosmopolitanism. The difference between 
the two is that, under pressures to assimilate into the dominant state narrative, 
hybrid subjects can choose to attempt to change institutions and rules to accom-
modate their multiple loyalties, or reject nation-centric frameworks altogether, 
asserting themselves as something separate, a sort of ‘Third Space’ (Bhabha, 
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1994; Kwok-Bun & Plüss, 2013). In other words, transnationalism can be seen 
as a constructive mode of re-negotiation of existing frameworks to create new 
systems that support fluid modes of living (e.g. having multiple citizenships, tax 
residencies, community memberships etc.), while cosmopolitanism rejects any 
institutional engagement (Kwok-Bun & Plüss, 2013). 
Ultimately, this research aims to shine light on the multiple loyalties and 
multi-place modes of existence of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and tries to 
articulate how their transnational practices and rhetoric fit into existing modes 
of coping with the pressures of hybridity, globalisation and conflict. 
To conclude, the theoretical framework of this research is multifaceted. At 
its core is the investigation of constructions of identity in the ontological sense. 
The main conceptualising tool to analyse changes in identity constructions is the 
concept of symbolic boundaries (Lamont, 1992). I look at the processes of 
identity construction and boundary-work in the context of acute social change 
(i.e. the conflict between Ukraine and Russia), which is understood through the 
concept of cultural trauma (Sztompka, 2000a). A consequence of trauma/ 
change, shifting physical and symbolic borders, creates the need to address 
transnational aspects of subjects’ social practices, including media practices 
(Couldry et al., 2014) and the way the re-conceptualisation of these practices 
feeds into identity- and boundary-work, which is done through the framework 
of transnationalism (Vertovec, 2007). I follow up the discussion of theoretical 
concepts with an in-depth look at the particulars of the case study, to flesh out 




4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main research question that unites the three studies comprising this research 
is: How has the construction of the national identity of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians transformed in the context of the conflict with Russia? 
 
More specific sub-questions explored in Studies I, II and III are: 
 
1. How do Russian-speaking Ukrainians reflect the political changes 
resulting from the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in their con-
struction of national and ethnic identity? 
1.1. How is the annexation of Crimea narrated by Crimean residents? – 
Study I. 
1.2. How have symbolic boundaries between Ukraine and Russia been 
conceptualised and narrated by the Russian-speaking Ukrainians since 
the start of the conflict? – Study II. 
 
2. How do Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ discourses around online media 
practices reflect the changes in their construction of Ukraine’s national 
and ethnic identity in the context of the crisis? – Study III. 
 
3. What role do transnational practices play in the identity construction of 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the conflict context? 
3.1. What transnational aspects can be found in the digital media practices 
of Russian-speaking Ukrainians? – Study III. 
3.2. What role have these practices played in performing identity and civic 
engagement among Russian-speaking Ukrainians since the start of the 
conflict? – Study III. 
 
4. How can the study of transnational subjects’ identity construction in the 





5.1. Research inspired by sociological reflexivity 
The body of this research is comprised of three studies conducted using 
qualitative methods, based on the fieldwork carried out in Crimea in 2016 and in 
Kyiv in 2018. The qualitative method design makes it possible to channel a 
multitude of experiences – collecting data through fieldwork, observations of 
participants’ behaviour and the stories that surface during interviews – into a 
comprehensive and holistic picture (Creswell et al., 2007). This picture, how-
ever, cannot be fully understood without engaging with the researcher regarding 
their positionality in the field in relation to the study topic, and the foundations 
that have informed the general approach of this study. 
As the research was conducted two years after the annexation (Study I) and 
four years after the Revolution of Dignity/start of the conflict (Study II and 
III), it involved post-hoc constructions produced by individuals to make sense 
of the change, and the individual level discourses were expected to relate to the 
structures of the socio-political context, and systematically reproduce the new 
boundaries between state/group identities of the given community.  
In this research, I tried to create space for participants to reflect on their 
relationship with the concept of national and ethnic identity in the context of 
conflict. I tried to balance this by reflecting on my own relationship with these 
concepts and various institutional frameworks (as a person born and raised in 
Crimea) that might have conditioned my interpretation of the findings. I address 
this through the self-reflection subchapter of this chapter. I also address ethical 




5.2. Sample and the interview framework  
The materials collected with the help of participants through semi-structured 
interviews were analysed using the tools of discourse analysis, which is a com-
mon approach in identity and ontological narrativity research (Alexander et al., 
2004; Eyerman, 2001; Giddens, 1991; Sztompka, 2004). I allowed flexibility in 
both the sampling procedure and the interviewing process; having entered the 
study with one set of research questions, I exited with a different set. 
Overall, during the whole study I remained open to different sampling 
arrangements, although in the end the snowball method was used most often. 
I activated my personal networks in both Crimea and Kyiv and, since most of 
my networks were from childhood times and were quite diverse, the variability 
of participants’ backgrounds was ensured to some extent.  
The combined sample of the research (Studies I, II and III) included 31 
participants, with their demographic characteristics outlined in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The sample of the study 
 Ukraine 
Total number of people who were interviewed  31 
Locations of interviews  Kyiv (14 interviews) 





Up to 35 14 
36–55 years 12 







5.2.1. Study I 
Study I included 17 interviews that were conducted in January 2016 in several 
cities of Crimea (Dzhankoy, Simferopol, Sevastopol and Feodosiia). Five 
interview candidates were selected from a distance; after arrival in Crimea and 
the commencement of the interviewing process, a snowball method paired with 
‘purposive’ (‘convenience’) sampling was used. I used my personal network in 
Crimea and the help of one contact person with a certain prominence in the 
community to engage the participants. Then, the initial participants were asked 
to suggest possible candidates for further interviewing. The snowball method 
has its limitations, but turned out to be a necessity due to the precarious nature 
of doing research in an occupied territory. 
The selection criteria for participants were permanent residency in the 
Crimean Peninsula and, ultimately, willingness to discuss political topics. Their 
age ranged from 22 to 67 years old (the distribution was rather even); there were 
five men and 12 women. Occupation-wise, the largest share of my participants 
came from the private sector (six were private entrepreneurs), followed by 
medical workers (two), pensioners (two), university employees (two), students 
(two), teachers (two) and a designer. In terms of education, most of the parti-
cipants had un/finished higher education. This result was coincidental: even 
though Study I mentions ‘higher education’ as a criterion for participant selection, 
I never actually inquired about education levels when looking for potential 
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participants (before the interviews). Many of the participants were born in the 
Soviet Union, where acquiring higher education was free and widespread; they 
might also have reported finishing vocational schools as having higher edu-
cational levels, or could have just provided a socially desirable answer. These 
reasons could explain (at least partially) the over-representation of educated 
people in the sample. This limitation is further addressed in section 5.3.1. 
In terms of subjective self-identification, eight identified as ‘Russian’, five 
as ‘Ukrainian’, one as ‘Ukrainian and Crimean’, one as ‘Crimean Tatar’, and 
one as ‘Crimean’. Some participants were ambiguous or unable to clearly state 
their ethnic identity, probably because the notion of ‘Ukrainian Russophone’ 
has experienced a drift in meaning and became blurred with ‘Russians in 
Ukraine’ (Zakem et al., 2015). I stopped recruiting new participants when no 
new themes emerged during the interviews. At some point, I also started sensing 
possible risks in attracting the attention of the authorities in such a small com-
munity (dangers to my contact person and myself) in the context of human 
rights violations in Crimea. 
My interview framework underwent transformation during the course of the 
study as well. While I had a programme for the semi-structured interview (see 
Appendix) that focused on asking about the participants’ backgrounds, self-
identifications, language use etc., in the course of interviews, which sometimes 
lasted up to three hours, I found myself listening to my participants talk about 
everything that had happened in their lives in the past two or three years, 
reflecting the intertwining of the political and the personal (Harutyunyan et al., 
2009). Due to the widely discussed role of attitude in the cultural trauma and 
explicit stance-taking, in which participants engaged before re-telling their stories, 
I decided to classify interviewees in terms of their attitudes to the change (sup-
portive, non-supportive or ambivalent), although, of course, each individual’s 
stance was more a point on a continuum than a clear-cut position (Sztompka, 
2000a). The participants’ stances were also examined in terms of the clarity of 
the narration of their emotions, as this related to participants’ feelings of 
ideational integrity and ontological security (Giddens, 1991; Somers, 1994). 
During the interviews and subsequent analysis, I observed the themes (trauma, 
identity and belonging) emerge bottom-up, rather than ascribing meanings by 
enforcing a strict interview framework. 
 
 
5.2.2. Studies II and III 
Study II was based on a collection of 14 in-depth interviews gathered in Kyiv in 
2018. I used a similar method synthesis: activating my network in Kyiv, and 
following ‘purposive’ sampling logic coupled with the snowball method. The 
main criteria for participants included Russian as the main language of com-
munication (in many cases, the language of ‘thinking’) and Ukrainian citizen-
ship. Most of the participants also had Ukraine as the place of socialisation 
during their formative years.  
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The snow-ball method became particularly useful as initially I focused on 
the Kyiv-based Russian-speakers, who generally had a very clear sense of ethnic 
and national belonging by virtue of living close to the political centre in the 
aftermath of a civic protest movement (the Revolution of Dignity, 2013–2014). 
However, in the course of the interviews, I gained access to networks of internally 
displaced persons from the eastern regions of Ukraine (IDPs) residing in Kyiv, 
who provided complex context and an illustration of different strategies of the 
conceptualisation of national and ethnic identities. Additionally, both Crimean 
residents and IDPs had much more heterogeneous media consumption practices 
than Kyiv dwellers, which became clear in Study III. Overall, it made the sample 
more representative of the study focus: the periphery between symbolic ‘Ukraine’ 
and ‘Russia’. Eight participants were from the Donetsk or Luhansk areas, two 
from Crimea and the other four from Kyiv. This provided additional value to 
the cross-cutting issues raised by participants, as well as the thin context of the 
analysis. Women were slightly over-represented (eight vs. six men), and the 
sample was also slightly skewed towards the civic sector in terms of professions 
(four out of 14).  
As with Study I, the interview format included semi-structured discussions of 
such topics as language practices, changes in participants’ lives after 2014, 
changes in the country, experiences of travelling in Ukraine and Russia, national 
and other identifications, general media use, etc. The semi-structured format 
(see Appendix for the interview programme) was more productive in the case of 
Studies II and III as the interviews were more removed in time from the events 
of 2013–2014 (the start of the conflict) than during Study I, and I felt that the 
participants needed more guidance in shifting between topics. However, I still 
aimed to remain flexible and pick up on emerging topics and areas of interest for 
participants.  
For the purposes of Study III, which examined rationalisations for media 
use, I added a number of interactive exercises, where participants recreated their 
online media routines, while commenting on (rationalising) their particular 
activities (Wodak, 2009). Sharing an activity with the study participants added 
an element of play to the interviews (Malaby, 2009), and reinforced the idea 














All three studies broadly employed discourse analysis, but focussed on different 
approaches, based on the focus of the study (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Analysis overview 
 Study I Study II Study III 
Sample 17 participants 
(Crimea, multiple 
locations) 







Interactive exercises + 
interviews 
Analysis Discourse analysis, 
narrative analysis 
Discourse-historical 
approach of Discourse 
analysis 
Social practice analysis 




of the annexation 








and Russia (R1) 









group boundaries in 
the conflict context; 
how this affects 
national identity 
narratives in Ukraine 
(R1) 
Describe changing 
online media practices 
among Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians: how hybrid 
online media practices 





and discourses affect 
the Ukrainian national 
identity narrative (R3) 
 
 
5.3.1. Narrative analysis and discourse analysis – Studies I and II 
Studies I and II analyses were broadly informed by the discourse-analytical 
approach. Discourse analysis is a more general research method that studies 
language in its entirety, together with the extra-linguistic context, practices and 
meanings created in the process of using speech. Critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), on the other hand, is concerned with how language is used to uphold 
power institutions and inequalities (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Study I used 
narrative analysis (which is part of CDA), focusing on how participants, using 
language in connection to context, made sense of their life experiences, and how 
this informed their views of themselves as individuals and members of national 
and ethnic groups. Study II used the discourse-historical approach (DHA), also 
part of CDA, and focused more specifically on how language (as part of 
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discourse) is used to construct identities and group boundaries in a particular 
historical context (De Celia et al., 1999). 
The use of narrative analysis in Study I was justified by the proven role of 
story-telling in identity development, as stories reflect ‘…a degree of embodi-
ment, absorption in a story to real-world effects’ (Daiute & Lightfoot, 2004, 
p. 14). Somers & Gibson (1993) even claim that narrative is an ‘ontological 
condition of a social life’, by which they mean that experiences are assembled 
and combined in order to ‘fit’ a cohesive narrative that usually reinforces the 
feeling of ontological security. Narratives affect the performativity of identity 
(whereby an act of speech consummates an action), but they also absorb and 
reflect changes in actors and the space of performance, as well as unintended 
consequences of the narrative (Lloyd, 1999).  
As for Study II, the analysis of the collected materials was conducted in the 
Discourse-Historical Approach of the Critical Theory, as conceptualised for the 
field of politics and national identity research by Reisigl and Wodak (De Celia 
et al., 1999; Reisigl, 2008, 2014, 2017). The DHA offers a reasonable flexibility 
in analysing a given societal challenge by focusing on developing conceptual 
tools for each particular problem, without ‘getting lost in the grand theories’, 
and it has been tested in many studies in the field (Wodak, 2015b, 2015a). 
 
DHA suggests a general multilevel top-down analysis scheme:  
(1) The topic/content of the discourse, 
(2) Specific discursive strategies (argumentation), 
(3) Means and forms of realisation (Wodak, 2009). 
 
As for the thematic content of the analysed materials, in Study II I focused on the 
linguistic construction of the ‘boundaries’ between what it means to be Ukrainian 
or Russian; the perception of the border dynamics and narratives of the post-
2014 understanding of ‘Ukrainianness’ and ‘Russianness’, and their interrelation, 
as well as the subjects’ personal engagement with the borders. Where the ‘bor-
der(s)’ are, in a symbolic sense, defines who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, in other 
words the content of identity and subjectivity itself. I looked into the specific 
means of achieving the communicative goals (e.g. emphasising/de-emphasising 
the border), mostly strategies of assimilation (creating homogeneity) and dis-
similation (heterogeneity) (Wodak, 2009; Wodak & Matouschek, 1993).  
I analysed the means and forms along the lines of personal references (use of 
pronouns, generic terms etc.), spatial references (toponyms and geonyms) and 
temporal references (use of times). 
For the purposes of better understanding the context of acts of speech, means 
and forms of realisation are discussed in their relation to strategies. Means and 
forms are mostly discussed in circumstances where they add to the under-





5.3.2. Social practice analysis – Study III 
For Study III, which involved both the analysis of media practices as phe-
nomena, and rationalisation strategies of participants engaging in them, I 
decided to adopt the lens of social practice theory-based analysis (which also 
allowed me to develop Couldry’s (2012) concept of media-related practices 
further), looking at three elements of social practice suggested by Shove & 
Pantzar (2005): 
(1) Meaning: interpretation attributed to practice by different groups of practi-
tioners, as well as outsiders, who may understand a practice differently.  
(2) Tools: objects necessary to perform the practice; room/space and infra-
structure that make an activity possible 
(3) Skills: reflective and tacit competences needed to perform a practice; both 
cognitive and bodily, both discursive and reflective, as well as practical 
and tacit. 
 
Based on the analysis of the core elements (meanings, skills and tools), I defined 
four categories of mutually related media practices (bundles of practices 
according to Schatzki & Schatzki (1996)) for analysis: media selection practices, 
content consumption practices, content creation practices and communication 
practices, which echo some of the types of practice developed by Couldry 
(2012); see also Vihalemm et al. (2019), Vihalemm & Juzefovičs (2020).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mapping of media practices 
 
In the bundle of media practices, I see media selection as framing practice that 
forms the infrastructure for the performance of other practices. Couldry talks 
about searching and search enabling practices: different strategies of how 
people ‘optimize their access to vastly expanded flow of potentially relevant 
information’ (Couldry, 2012, p. 32). This is also close to the ‘searching and 
organising practices’ defined by Vihalemm & Juzefovičs (2020).  
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In this study, I expanded on the more general tension outlined by Couldry 
(2012): between keeping channels open (heterophily) and screening out (homo-
phily); in other words, whether a user is prioritising diverse, potentially chal-
lenging sources of getting information, as opposed to streamlined, single-nar-
rative ones. Heterophily is defined as engaging with content/activities that either 
originate from countries other than Ukraine or from occupied/uncontrolled 
territories (Crimea and parts of the Donbass). I looked into rationalisations and 
interpretations attached to choosing some media platforms over others, sub-
scribing/unsubscribing, etc.: activities focused on putting together a certain 
media ‘puzzle’. These practices presupposed specific tools and skills, e.g. in the 
Ukrainian context, the ability to use VPN for certain platforms.  
The ‘allure of homophily’ (Gu et al., 2014) is that people often seek 
familiarity/reassurance through their online practices. On the other hand, 
researchers have consistently associated heterophily with civic engagement, and 
it is generally accepted that more diverse and issue-oriented media practices lead 
to higher levels of civic engagement (for an overview, see Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, 
& Valenzuela, 2012). At the same time, it has been demonstrated that while 
hybrid communities tend to construct their news consumption from multiple 
sources, ‘like a puzzle’, this does not often lead to taking up alternative narratives 
(Szostek, 2017, 2018a; Vihalemm & Juzefovičs, 2020). Therefore, the influence 
of the conflict context on the way users engaged in and rationalised practices of 
heterophily, as well as the impact of heterophily on the civic identity narrative, 
became a part of this study. 
Communication practices, in turn, carried the meaning of conveying informa-
tion between users privately. The wide variety of tools employed presupposed 
varying degrees of competences, in addition to the general knowledge of using 
specific resources. Moreover, conflict-imposed limitations (e.g. the severance of 
mobile connection with occupied territories, and the blocking of VK) made 
users adapt according to their level of competence. Transnational practices here 
were conceptualised as engaging in communication with users from abroad 
and/or carrying alternative narratives (e.g. from Russia and the uncontrolled 
territories (Crimea and the Donbass). 
I defined content consumption as practices of passive acquisition of informa-
tion, accompanied by various meanings: news, entertainment, hobbies, etc. In 
this sense Couldry’s (2012) and Vihalemm & Juzefovičs’ (2020) ‘keeping up 
with the news’ constitutes just one part of this broader category. Transnational 
practices in this category were understood as the consumption of content ori-
ginating from abroad/uncontrolled territories and/or conveying the challenging 
of mainstream (pro-Russian) narratives.  
Content creation practices were defined as practices carrying the meaning of 
production of new information (posting, uploading pictures etc.). Due to the inter-
active nature of the tools involved (social network platforms), content creation 
practices often contained a significant degree of communication (e.g. com-
menting). In this sense, the line between content creation and communication is 
blurry, although content creation mostly happens in the public sphere, while 
46 
communication happens in private. Content creation generally requires higher 
level skills (as well as aesthetic competence) than communication does. Transna-
tional practices here were understood as producing content that challenged the 
state narrative and/or brought ‘alien’ elements (e.g. the re-conceptualisation of 
uncontrolled territories) into the discourse. 
Defined practices were mapped along the axes of the degree of homo- / 
heterophily (to illustrate the degree of transnationalism) and engagement. The 
analysis was done by practice category, to illustrate various practices (low 
engagement homophily, low engagement heterophily etc.) side by side, while 
enabling better comparison. Strategies of rationalisation were discussed to 
identify concepts and values that participants referred to, as well as specific 
meanings attached to practices. 
To conclude, the methodology of this research combines several approaches 
depending on the analytical aim and the object of inquiry of each particular study, 
but is ultimately informed by the foundations of the discourse analysis approach. 
The findings of the studies are presented according to the general logic of the 
research question in the following chapter. 
 
 
5.4. Limitations, ethics and reflections 
Before discussing the study findings, I will address the limitations arising from 
the study design and some aspects of the methodology. I will also return to the 
foundations of this study, inspired by sociological reflexivity, and address a 
number of issues arising from doing a qualitative study in a politically-polarised 
context on a topic that has importance for both participants and me, as a 
researcher and agent in a particular social structure. I will follow Bourdieu & 
Wacquant’s (1992) tradition of reflexivity in sociology, and will attempt to 
outline tensions between the structural properties that have conditioned the way 
I conceive of the subject matter and my individual circumstances that may have 
influenced the study’s conclusions. This exercise in self-inquiry will allow me 
to reserve space for agency and creativity in this study and, more importantly, to 





The first limitation of this study is the possible bias caused by the sampling 
methods. Because of the context of the research, especially in Crimea, the 
sampling tended to rely too much on convenience, skewing the heterogeneity of 
the population. The snowball method also tends to produce homogeneous 
samples; however, there is a difference between using the snowball method 
simply for procuring contacts and using it as a methodological guideline 
(Atkinson & Flint, 2001). I strived to balance the sample composition and involve 
those participants that were more likely to give diverse perspectives. 
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The sample of Study I was fairly representative of different age groups and 
somewhat representative of different geographical areas of Crimea, but was signi-
ficantly skewed towards women and those with skills/education. The per-
spectives of men, and especially uneducated men, were marginalised. I tried to 
counter the bias in Studies II and III, reaching the final composition of 2:1 
(women:men). One partial counterargument is that there are more women than 
men in Crimea and in Ukraine (1.2:1)11, and women are more likely to parti-
cipate in sociological studies overall (Curtin et al., 2000). The number of women 
was also likely the result of the heavier use of the snowball method in Study I 
than in Studies II and III. However, I would argue that among the participants I 
witnessed the emergence of similar narrative elements when describing the 
topic of the study. The discussions emphasised national, ethnic and (quite often) 
occupational/class identities, so gender performances were somewhat muted.  
Another issue is the location of the participant recruitment for Studies II and 
III. Even though my sample ended up being rather diverse (it included local 
Kyiv-raised Russian-speakers, and internally displaced persons from Donetsk, 
Luhansk and Crimea), Kyiv, as a research locality, clearly differs from other 
Ukrainian cities. On one hand, Kyiv is the capital of Ukraine, a large urban area, 
where the share of Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers is roughly equal12, which 
suggests that it is tolerant of Russian-speakers in general. On the other hand, 
Kyiv was the centre of the Revolution of Dignity protests; it has been and remains 
one of the most politically engaged cities in Ukraine. On one hand, it is reason-
able to assume that self-selection among the internally displaced persons who 
ended up participating in my studies occurred: those more pro-Ukrainian to 
begin with moved to Kyiv, while the pro-Russian ones moved to Russia, and 
never had a chance to participate. In addition, Kyiv is the economic centre of 
Ukraine (while also being more accessible than large Russian-dominated cities), 
so the economic factors are likely to have mitigated the influence of self-
selection. 
An even more important limitation of the study was the lack of Crimean 
Tatar representation. Crimean Tatars are the indigenous population of the 
Crimean Peninsula, and have carried on a civic struggle to receive compensation 
for the forced re-location of 1944 (Soviet period), as well as support for their 
cultural autonomy rights (Aydın, 2014). Since the annexation, there have been 
continuing reports of human rights violations specifically directed at Crimean 
Tatars, who have been vocal critics of the Russian state (Aydin & Sahin, 2019; 
Aydın, 2014). In 2015, a few months before the start of my fieldwork, four 
electric grid pylons (situated in southern Ukraine) that provided electricity to 
                                                                        
11  According to the Ukrainian electronic census conducted in 2019 and the data from the 
Russian statistical bureau on Crimea from 2018. 
12  A 2015 poll of the International Republication Institute (Canada) showed that 27% of 




Crimea were blown up, and it was widely assumed that Crimean Tatar activists 
perpetrated the attack13. When I was conducting my fieldwork, electricity was 
still supplied during certain hours of the day only, and the public attitude towards 
Tatars was rather negative and tense. I reached out to possible Tatar participants 
(succeeding in obtaining one), but overall I found it much harder to persuade 
Tatars that the interviews and their opinions would remain anonymous. Fear 
and uncertainty, coupled with the influence of my ethnic background, acted as 
hurdles to establishing trust and rapport with possible Tatar participants. I 
encountered similar concerns (tacit or explicit) with the Ukrainian Russian 
participants and worked to create a safe space for them, but did not succeed to 
the same degree with Crimean Tatars, as they perceived risks to be higher. 
I fully respected concerns regarding safety that were expressed; to some 
degree, however, unfortunately my study did not solicit perspectives from 
Crimean Tatars. This leads me to the discussion of ethics in the study, as well as 




Sociological research in conflict areas produces multiple concerns for the com-
munity and for the researcher. These are concerns regarding ‘doing no harm’ to 
research participants, difficulties in accessing marginalised groups in a polarised 
context and the general lack of trust resulting from fear that can skew the results 
or make the research impossible altogether (Leuenberger, 2015). Fear exists in 
public and private spaces; it is reproduced through national (media) discourses 
and is usually combined with participants’ psychic experiences, in this case of 
the annexation: glimpses of armed units, the appearance of a different currency, 
and changes in taxation and school programmes (Shirlow & Pain, 2003). While 
fear makes it harder to access participants’ insights by conventional means, it 
encourages the researcher to rely more heavily on co-creation and truly parti-
cipatory frameworks in the research, as a way to mitigate barriers of mistrust. 
In the case of this research, I started off by addressing participants’ concerns 
directly, usually in conversations that preceded the dissemination of consent 
forms. All of the participants in the three studies signed informed consent 
forms, where I outlined the subject of the research (as much as I could define its 
focus at that time) and my obligations to protect the participants’ anonymity and 
confidentiality. I took responsibility for anonymising interview materials so that 
quotes couldn’t be linked to individuals, and for outlining how the raw data 
would be stored. The informed consent form followed the conventions for 
sociological research accepted at the University of Tartu, and was approved by 
my supervisor.  
                                                                        
13  BBC 2015, ‘Crimea without power after pylons blown up’, accessed at:  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34893493  
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I shared the interview programme for all studies with the participants before 
the interviews; however, I found that it had little effect on the course of the 
interviews, as most people neglected to read it. Before the start of every inter-
view, I made sure to outline again the focus of the study, and my respons-
ibilities as a researcher towards the participants. 
The research resulted in the publication of articles in peer-reviewed journals 
in English. While sharing drafts wasn’t possible for the first article, as the 
majority of the participants didn’t speak English, with the second article I 
shared the draft with the interviewees and asked for their feedback. I had some 
participants change the translation and wording of their quotes to better reflect 
their views; several other participants recommended articles that they felt would 
be useful for my research and/or that supported their world-views. These were 
limited aspects of co-creation that I nevertheless was happy to facilitate (Mulder 




One major challenge of qualitative research, especially in a one-on-one setting, 
is that the researcher’s socialisation and values can influence participants’ 
accounts (Creswell et al., 2007). To address that issue, I tried to reflect on any 
possible biases I might have and, for the purposes of the transparency of this 
study, situate myself in the field and disclose any pre-conceptions I might hold 
about the topic and participants (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Chaudhry, 1997). 
Moreover, the interview accounts were influenced by attributes, other than being 
a researcher, that generally shape interactions within the field: nationality, lan-
guage spoken, class, gender etc. (Lincoln, 2005).  
I am a Russian-speaking (or bilingual) Ukrainian, born in Crimea, in inde-
pendent Ukraine. I share the language and experiences of socialisation and edu-
cation with most of my participants, which made it easier to establish trust and 
connection. However, this might have also reinforced their immediate identi-
fications as Russian-speakers, as the interviews were conducted in Russian and 
discussed issues of politics and identity.  
My family context, coupled with the lack of consistent educational and lan-
guage policies in Crimea, has significantly shaped my social positioning in 
Ukraine, as well as some of my views on national identity. My family is mixed: 
one parent is ethnic Russian and the other is ethnic Ukrainian, and both of them 
were newcomers in Crimea. With a lack of discussion of ethnic or national 
issues at home and in school, I felt like many of my peers and I lacked socialisa-
tion into the Ukrainian state. The feeling of alienation from both Ukraine and 
Russia for me went away after the university years in Kyiv, supporting the 
assumption that higher education institutions often act as spaces for socialisation 
into national identity practices through repeated enactment of ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (Shahjahan & Kezar, 2013). My own conceptions of nationalism 
and patriotism were also formed in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity 
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(2013–2014), which coincided with my student years. During the protests and 
the ensuing annexation, I felt mostly fear and shock, feelings that probably were 
shared by many people not used to reflecting on matters of politics, identity and 
public interest. However, similar to some of my study participants, the years 
after the events were characterised by post-hoc reflections on what the events of 
2013–2014 meant or why they happened. My assumption is that these reflec-
tions, if studied qualitatively, can show the changes that drastic events – including 
conflicts – can have on national and ethnic identity construction processes. 
However, there is always a risk that one’s ideas will eclipse reality, which is 
why, after understanding how ‘close’ I am to the topic of the study, I focused on 
distancing myself from any preconceptions I had on the matter and trying to 
stick to neutral performances as a researcher (e.g. emphasising that I was from 
an Estonian university), to limit my influence on the participants. 
Having discussed the methodological foundations of this study, in the next 
chapter I will present the results from Studies I, II and III, grouped by themes. 
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6. FINDINGS  
6.1. Shifts in identity narratives in Ukraine after 2013–2014 
The results of Study I, Study II and Study III converge on the events of 2013–
2014, the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the start of the 
conflict in Donbas, leading to major shifts in how identity construction and 
boundary-work were approached on the individual level, especially as concerns 
the relationship – and symbolic boundaries in various life spheres – with Russia. 
As mentioned above, I agree with Knott (2018) in viewing peripheral spaces 
in Ukraine, such as Crimea and the eastern regions, as spaces where, before the 
conflict, in many ways because of the legacies of the Soviet past, language 
mixing and widespread use of cross-border media content, ethnic categories of 
‘Ukrainians’ and ‘Russians’ collapsed; basically, one identity was not mutually 
exclusive of the other. In other words, people could identify as ‘both Ukrainian 
and Russian’. 
The results of Studies I and II point to the fact that that, to a large extent, has 
not been the case since 2013. The main result of the events of 2013–2014 was 
that the two ethnic categories became irreconcilable with one another, and it 
became increasingly difficult to maintain an identity as both Ukrainian and 
Russian (hybrid). However, comparing the findings from Studies I and II 
illuminates the different dynamics of border construction in different spaces of 
Ukraine: the former periphery (Crimea, Study I) vs the more centrally connected 
(and formerly more politically active) regions in the east and in the capital 
region (Studies II and III).  
Study I focused on Crimea as a habitat shaping narratives of its participants; 
it identified three more or less distinctive ways that people made sense of the 
protests of 2013 and the annexation in 2014, based on the division of participants 
into supporters of the change, non-supporters and the ambivalent. Study I claimed 
that these narratives served as bases for new identities, supporting the claim of 
Somers & Gibbson (1993) that narratives function as spaces for identity 
performance. The field work for Study I was conducted in 2016, two years prior 
to the field work for Studies II and III, therefore offering a glance at Crimea as a 
microcosm characterised by extremely polarised narratives almost right after the 
change, as opposed to mainland Ukraine, where the division arguably is not as 
drastic and is further removed in time (comparatively distanced from the 
traumatising event). 
As was mentioned above, Study I identified three narratives of the political 
change in Crimea. The sole fact of the group division and existence of opposing, 
more or less coherent, narratives among participants leads to the conclusion that 
the change in Crimea resulted in the creation of additional boundaries inside the 
community and, ultimately, undermined its unity. The stories told by participants 
mirrored, although in a more personal way, grander narratives perpetuated by 
public discourses of Ukraine and Russia (‘Russian aggression’ vs. ‘coming 
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home to Russia’), incorporating echoes of the recently strengthened Ukrainian 
nationalism and Russian expansionism. 
The findings of Study II supported the conclusions of Study I, although 
offering a glimpse from ‘the Other side’. While Study I focused on a community 
with a majority pro-Russian stance (even though non-supporters were part of 
the sample), Study II mostly engaged with Russian-speakers who were still 
hybrid in practices, but by and large pro-Ukrainian. Study II results demon-
strated rather strong border solidification (which would be expected given the 
conflict). The conflict that started in 2014 was framed as a ‘watershed’ that 
placed individuals into a value system that demanded clear side-taking; more-
over, some accounts corroborated the claim that previously Ukrainians and 
Russians effectively acted as one in peripheral regions (‘In Donetsk, we didn’t 
separate into Ukrainians and Russians…’14). What is noteworthy in the context 
of the conflict is that Russian-speaking participants from these areas (compared 
with Russian-speakers from Kyiv) felt under greater pressure to adapt to the 
changes in performance and narratives of the Ukrainian national identity, to 
‘justify’ their hybrid practices (e.g. speaking Russian), which was ultimately 
manifested in two possible responses: acceptance of the border solidification or 
negotiation/denial.  
Study I, as mentioned above, was conducted just two years after the crisis, at 
the same time that the electricity blackout and subsequent cut-off of Crimea from 
the Ukrainian electricity grid exacerbated political tensions. Therefore, Study I 
offers a fresh, almost raw look into the divided community dynamics. Study II, 
conducted in 2018, engaged with the process of border solidification that arguably 
had been happening for a longer stretch of time. Accounts of participants in 
Study II united often contradictory statements, which, in turn, can be grouped 
around two poles, highlighting the main tension in the narrative: acceptance of 
the solidification of border(s) (the theme of ‘National awakening’) vs. nego-
tiation or denial of the solidification (the theme of ‘Manipulation/Unnecessary 
securitisation’). Ultimately, the accounts demonstrated a complex blend of efforts 
to construct some borders while de-constructing others. 
To understand this point more deeply, we should recall that there is not one, 
but multiple borders which the population of Ukraine engages with, as previous 
research has suggested. The one that became heavily politicised after the out-
break of the conflict is the macro-border between symbolic ‘Ukraine’ and 
‘Russia’ as states. However, participants’ accounts demonstrated a rather dynamic 
picture, where borders were understood in relation and interaction with each 
other (e.g. external state borders vs. internal west/east division, value-based, 
cultural and linguistic borders). Moreover, the accounts were dominated by the 
tension between the ‘brightness’ and ‘blurriness’ of various aspects of the 
borders, such as language, media practices, consumption, cultural preferences, 
certain traditions and symbols, and even clothes. While the participants employed 
                                                                        
14  Interview 3, Kyiv, February 2018 
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active efforts to construct some aspects of the border(s), other aspects were 
negotiated, challenged and denied. 
Border solidification between Ukraine and Russia was framed through the 
narrative of ‘National awakening’ and ‘Support for Ukraine’, a voluntary effort 
to either construct one’s own identity as a ‘Ukrainian’ or to bring one’s life-story 
and life-attributes in line with the dominant understanding of ‘Ukrainianness’ 
(Study II). Accounts manifested an active process of manufacturing visual/ 
linguistic/cultural cues to substantiate one’s position within the symbolic space 
of Ukraine in the context of decreasing support for blurriness and hybridity, and 
increased cross-labelling (but at the same time, small perceived distances 
between the groups). In other words, Study II showed that as a result of the 
conflict and polarisation inside the country, being a Russian-speaker (especially 
from the Donbas or Crimea) came to mean a degree of ambiguity and risk, 
which some participants tried to mitigate by adjusting their cultural practices 
(switching to Ukrainian, consuming more Ukrainian media etc.). The case was 
the opposite for Study I, because, as a result of the annexation, the political 
context supported practices that were associated with the Russian cultural space 
(speaking Russian, consuming Russian media etc.). Therefore, as concerns 
Study II, the border construction cues mentioned above – language use, symbols 
etc. – can be seen as means of justifying the new position of Russian-speakers 
in the context of solidification, which were transactional in nature. But the 
process of engaging with some transactions and denying others suggests that the 
participants not only reflected on the changes in the public narrative, but also 
exercised active agency in constructing the meaning of ‘Ukrainianness’. 
Study II builds on the conclusions of Study I, illuminating how, in the 
polarisation and border solidification caused by the conflict, active re-nego-
tiation happened: how much Ukrainian should be used? How ‘Ukrainian’ should 
the culture preferences be? How much deviation was permitted? etc. As the 
distance between the two populations was not large, both, arguably, engaged in 
the negotiation of the meaning and value of the border-constructing practices. 
The Russian-speakers’ lowered status meant that they had less leverage to exert, 
although the double competence provided more opportunities for manoeuvring. 
 
 
6.2. Narratives of change –  
strategies of drawing distinctions 
As noted above, in the case of Crimea, narratives served as spaces to perform new 
(post-annexation) identities, both for non-supporters (who reported ‘feeling more 
Ukrainian’) and supporters, who had to integrate themselves into a new ‘Russian 
Crimea’ community.  
Study I found that non-supporters reflected and perpetuated the dominant 
narrative of the Ukrainian public sphere: that they were direct victims of the 
policy of the Russian Federation, violated and abused. The perceived absence of 
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justice on the part of the perpetrator (Russia), disempowerment, isolation, and 
denial of their victimhood in the Russian media and public debate only 
strengthened the distancing from Russia as a state and the Russian people. To 
support the assumptions of Kulyk (2014), anti-Russia sentiments were not so 
much rooted in ethnic factors (the proximity of Ukrainian and Russian cultural 
spaces was rarely denied), but rather in the issues of politics, policies and values. 
Running completely opposite to the narrative of non-supporters, the most 
traumatic, central element of the story for the supporters was the series of protests 
in 2013, the Revolution of Dignity. According to the participants’ accounts, it 
not only constituted an act of unnecessary violence (‘dirty politics’ or ‘a clash 
for power’), but also a complete rejection of ‘common Slavic values’ (again 
recalling Kuzio’s references to the 2013 Revolution of Dignity as a clash 
between Western Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic nationalisms (Kuzio, 2015b)). 
The invisible presence of the boundary played a significant role in the 
interaction of identity spaces of supporters and non-supporters: while the former 
refused to establish/acknowledge a boundary between Russians and Ukrainians 
(the theme of the ‘non-existent Ukraine’), the latter, being confronted with the 
experiences of ‘Russian Crimea’, constructed a clear boundary between them-
selves and the supporters (this is further elaborated in Study II). This boundary 
also facilitated maintaining the connection with the Ukrainian identity land-
scape for them, and even contributed to their deeper integration. 
Participants’ narratives revolved around two issues: community (its integrity) 
and agency (responsibility). Labelling Crimeans as ‘traitors’ and Russians as 
‘perpetrators’, a central element in narratives of both supporters and non-sup-
porters of the geopolitical change in Crimea became a profound act of rejection; 
the Ukrainian community, always perceived as kin, now turned out to be un-
friendly, alien and accusatory. In the same way that the protests of 2013 were 
perceived as disregarding Crimean identity, ‘forgetting and abusing it’, the post-
Crimean Ukraine, with its emphasis on ‘being European’ and demonising Russia, 
was seen as a denial of an important part of the supporters’ identity. In this sense, 
the change was seen as ‘evil’ because it placed in direct contraposition ideas of 
Ukrainian and Russian statehood and identity: by choosing one you denied the 
other. Supportive participants’ accounts reflected on the newly established 
boundary breaking up a ‘Slavic’ unity between Ukraine and Russia, while the 
non-supportive participants were instead concerned with a new boundary inside 
the Crimean community, which undermined its integrity. 
On a deeper level though, the narrative of non-supporters was more con-
cerned with the identifications of Crimean supporters and the figurative and 
physical boundary between Ukraine and Crimea, as the Other. This division 
concerned many things: most prominently, views on Ukrainian nationhood and 
statehood. When asked to reproduce the story of events which had happened 
two years before, participants always said first that the perpetrator (Russia) 
abused the community (the Crimean population). However, later there was an 
admission of the shock of realisation that a significant share of the Crimean 
population was afraid/alien/aggressive/indifferent towards Ukraine, and the 
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community did not really exist in the way it was seen by non-supporters, as well 
as Ukrainians in a more general sense. Not only was the ‘imagined community’ 
with Ukrainians denied, but the act of denial (the referendum) was interpreted 
as a refusal to accept Ukrainian nationhood and identity. The protests of 2013 
(the Revolution of Dignity), as a symbol of democratic renaissance (in the 
Ukrainian public discourse, as mentioned by Kuzio (2015a), as well as Ukrainian 
agency as a state were not recognised, echoing Suslov’s point about the almost 
neo-colonial denial of the existence of Ukrainian statehood widespread in the 
Russian mainstream public discourse (Suslov, 2014). And the act was also seen 
as retrospective: the common identity between supporters and non-supporters, 
as well as between Ukraine and Crimea, not only ceased to exist, but its previous 
existence was also denied. The narrative of ‘betrayal’ (by Russia as an aggressor, 
by other Crimeans and/or by Ukraine) also demonstrates that the change was 
interpreted through the concepts of human relations. 
Study II moved on from there and asked the question, in the context of 
polarisation: what narrative strategies do hybrid subjects – Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians – use to construct/negotiate/deconstruct symbolic boundaries between 
themselves, Russians and Ukrainians?  
The study identified two types of responses to border solidification (two sets 
of narrative strategies): acceptance of the solidification of (some) borders vs. 
negotiation/denial.  
Different ways to frame the solidification caused the production of various 
strategies of border construction and deconstruction. The strategies of construc-
tion included the following narratives: These are different states (emphasis on 
formal state attributes, and public and historical narratives); The people are dif-
ferent (placing the Ukrainian and Russian populations in opposition to each 
other through dichotomisation of their characteristics); and They represent dif-
ferent values (framing the difference through the opposition of democratic vs. 
undemocratic).  
The strategies of border deconstruction included: Staying true to yourself 
(Double Competence) (emphasis on accepting and reaffirming one’s hybrid 
dissenting characteristics), Manipulation of the people (the narrative of distrust 
of nationalism and denial of the politicisation of life practices), and Particu-
larisation (deconstructing the concepts of ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Russia’ as holistic and 
homogeneous). 
The results of Study II substantiated that Russia and ‘Russianness’ have 
never formed a bigger (if one can apply such an attribute) Other for Ukraine. 
But for quite some time Russia has been an Other that is not dissimilar enough 
to produce a unified narrative/image of the symbolic border between Ukraine 
and Russia (Kulyk, 2018). The conflict, its interpretation and framing (not only 
in the Ukrainian, but also in the Western public discourse) contributed signi-
ficantly to solidifying the boundaries and building a more stream-lined national 
narrative, and participants’ accounts indeed manifested weaker or stronger 
instances of shifting (although no generalisations to the whole population can be 
made).  
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However, based on the content of the analysed strategies, I concluded that 
the underlying tension behind opposing narratives of constructing some borders 
while deconstructing others ultimately concerned the content of the dominant 
Ukrainian national identity narrative. To put it briefly, the deconstruction per-
formed by the Russian-speaking participants was mostly aimed at elements and 
practices framed as ‘cultural’ and ‘nationalistic’ (narrow), but not at civic ones. 
Conversely, the civic elements actually provided an additional framework (in the 
context of opposition between ‘democratic Ukraine’ and ‘undemocratic Russia’) 
for solidifying the symbolic boundary between the two states. Ultimately, how-
ever misused the distinction between ‘ethnic/cultural’ and ‘civic’ nationalisms 
has been (Kohn 1961), in the Ukrainian context there is a distinct tension bet-
ween ethnic and civic elements competing for dominance in the national identity 
narrative, and the Russian-speaking/hybrid populations in Ukraine have a bigger 
stake in the civic narrative. As was noted by Kuzio (2002), the degree of tension 
between essentialising and universalising elements in the public discourse 
depends on the stage of evolution of the nation-building and democratic con-
solidation: both factors point to Ukraine being in a more turbulent state at the 
moment, which explains the heightened tension.  
Kulyk (2017) noted that the link between language and nationality in Ukraine 
has been broken. In my view, we can add that while some narratives see this 
link as important, other emerging ones understand nationality, ‘being Ukrainian’ 
in civic terms, without any connection to culture-related practices, as ‘becoming 
Ukrainian’ has been interpreted as a choice grounded in the coordinates of a 
value-based conflict between Ukraine and Russia.  
Moreover, the findings of Study II suggested that a lot of the civic engage-
ment exhibited by the Russian-speaking participants was post-national, if not 
anti-national. It can be interpreted in terms of ‘national indifference’: a push-
back-response to rising Ukrainian nationalism (Redclift & Rajina, 2019). On the 
other hand, given the degree of reflexivity present in the analysed accounts, as 
well as (mostly) the embrace of citizenship in a more universal sense, this can 
be understood as a part of the Ukrainian civic national identity discourse. With 
the public debate oscillating between inclusive and exclusive national identity 
visions, this narrative can be seen as an attempt to de-securitise certain ‘ways of 
being’ for vulnerable populations in the conflict context. We can assume that, 
especially for well-educated Ukrainian Russian-speakers, a multitude of strategies 
is available for maintaining their position in the society (the distance between 
groups being small), but it is the post-2014 Ukrainian context itself that produces 
two opposite responses: an embrace of the more traditional nationalism (with its 
cultural elements) or its denial (and call for more hybridity). While in this new 
system of value coordinates the Russian-speakers’ challenging hybrid practices 
are more evident than before the conflict (as now Ukraine’s and Russia’s public 
narratives are not compatible any more), the conflict-caused solidification of 
boundaries provides a new opportunity to write this hybridity into the Ukrainian 
narrative through concepts of civic engagement. 
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6.3. Changes in online media practices in the context 
of conflict and polarisation 
While Study I illustrated the actualised boundary inside a community at the 
centre of conflict, mirroring the grander divide between the national identity 
narratives of Ukraine and Russia, and Study II focussed on how Russian-
speaking Ukrainians, in the context of this divide, negotiate symbolic boundaries 
between ‘Ukrainians’ and ‘Russians’, Study III focused on how the conflict-
induced polarisation was mirrored in people’s online media practices. The online 
context came into focus because it has been – during virtually all of Ukraine’s 
independence period – a hybrid transnational sphere where, because of the 
widespread use of the Russian language in Ukraine, symbolic boundaries between 
the two spaces (Ukraine and Russia) were the most porous. While the conflict 
created conditions conducive to media homophily (active nation-building, dis-
tancing from Russia and a ban on Russian resources), the findings of Study III 
showed that hybridity (interpreted as transnationalism) was still maintained 
through users’ networks and other micro-level mechanisms. Far from being 
passive receivers of pressure, users exercised their agency by re-shaping their 
media environments to better suit their needs and identities (unsubscribing, un-
following, deleting from friends and, ultimately, changing the platform). 
Study III focused on two aspects of digital practices: heterophily in infor-
mation channels and engagement, specifically looking into what strategies parti-
cipants who either engaged, or didn’t engage, in transnational media practices 
used to rationalise their activities. The mapping of practices (developing the 
conceptualisation of Couldry (2012) using social practice theory) is presented in 
Figure 2. As a result of the analysis, I concluded that heterogeneous (trans-
national) and homogeneous (nation-bound) practices with high levels of engage-
ment produced separate narratives of national identity in post-conflict Ukraine, 
echoing the findings of Study II.  
For all of the strategies, some digital media practices (posting, sharing news 
and other public digital activities) were viewed as constitutive expressions of 
their larger offline identities. However, the practices characterised by high 
engagement and homophily were rationalised through references to the need to 
‘grow’ one’s Ukrainian identity and support the state, thus being nation-centric. 
High engagement heterophily though was rationalised through references to the 
universal human rights/values discourse and, thus, national identity in this 
narrative was conceptualised from post-national and universalising positions.  
Practices characterised by low engagement and both homophily and hetero-
phily were rationalised using references to ‘comfort’ and one’s own inherent 
nature. However, there was an important distinction in the case of low engage-
ment/heterophily, where users’ explanations can be interpreted as efforts to de-
politicise mostly media practices of communication and the consumption of 
content from the ‘Other’ side as responses to state narratives growing more 
ethno-centric (Hutchings & Szostek, 2015; Teper, 2016). These practices can be 
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viewed as attempts to de-securitise issues of ethnicity – language, country of 
origin and culture – in their manifestations through media practices (Trošt & 
Mandić, 2017).  
 
 




The analysis of low engagement and high engagement transnational media 
practices supported the assumptions of Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2012) that enter-
tainment activities bear lower levels of transformativity than such practices as 
news consumption. Communication with people from ‘the Other’ side was either 
politicised, or deliberately de-politicised by participants (as in Study II), which 
supports the conclusion that the conflict created a divide between the symbolic 
communities of Ukraine and Russia, and the communication domain remained a 
contentious negotiation territory for transnational users (Study II). The content 
creation domain provided space for users to not only re-conceptualise their 
hybridity in the emerging national identity narrative of Ukraine, but also to re-
translate their views to the rest of the audience. We can assume that this is 
motivated by the post-conflict precariousness of the in-between position of the 
Russian-speaking participants (see also Study II). 
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The choice to construct a feed with a diversity of perspectives (‘to see what’s 
happening on the other side’) served to construct users’ identity narrative as 
knowledgeable (media) citizens, while in cases of high engagement homophily 
as loyal supporters of the country in conflict. Media practices were, therefore, 
securitised to a degree even on the lay level, although with significant room to 
manoeuvre for Russian-speaking Ukrainian users. The findings of Study III 
demonstrated a complex interaction between various pressures imposed on their 
practices online. This is not to say that their freedom was drastically limited, but 
rather that they were aware of how various factors shaped their public and semi-
public activities. 
Combining the results of Study III on the conceptualisation of cross-border 
practices and the construction of new citizen identities based on them with the 
findings of Studies I and II on the narrations of political change and how these 
narratives contributed to the shifting boundaries between national and ethnic 
identities in Ukraine suggests that a range of possible identity constructions 
emerged in the post-2013 context. These constructions are not breaks from 
previous dynamics of identity constructions that existed in Ukraine prior to the 
onset of the conflict, but reflect changes in configurations of normative, 
institutional and political elements in practice reproduction systems (Schatzki & 
Schatzki, 1996; Shove et al., 2015). I arranged the emerged identity constructions 
in a pattern of strategies for coping with social tensions brought on by the 
pressures of transnationalism and hybridity (Kwok-Bun & Plüss, 2013) to show 
different ways of negotiating partially incompatible loyalties in a polarised 
context (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Mapping of identification strategies of Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
 
 
What changed with the conflict is that arguably it became increasingly more 
complicated and less beneficial (in terms of social capital) to maintain double 
identification and multiple loyalties for some participants. However, it also 
provided ways to incorporate one’s hybridity into the dominant narrative, while 
at the same time innovating overall content and construction. The paths included: 
a) focusing on incorporating Russian elements into the essentialised under-
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standing of Ukrainian identity (1), b) ‘developing’ one’s cultural competence as 
a Ukrainian (2), c) emphasising being a good citizen via a narrative placing 
Ukrainian civic values in opposition to Russian ‘undemocratic’ culture (3). In 
addition, the above narratives were supplemented by more hybrid and fluid con-
ceptualisations of national identity (4,5). What’s important is that these con-
ceptualisations are not completely mutually exclusive, and findings point to the 
conclusion that the negotiation process is still active. The figure demonstrates 
how these various identity narratives are positioned vis-à-vis the nation state: 
whether fully nested in it (1–3); mobile, moving between several national 





This research has tackled a dual theoretical challenge. On one hand, it has 
addressed the tradition of studying the issue of Russian-speakers’ identity in 
Ukraine from the structuralist and functionalist perspectives, separating them 
into a more distinct ‘ethnic’ group and emphasising the group’s resistance to 
adopting linguistic and cultural practices (Arel & Khmelko, 1996; Janmaat & 
Piattoeva, 2007; Kulyk, 2001; Kuzio, 2001; G. Smith & Wilson, 1997). Arguably, 
this is an illustration of how the ahistorical approach to studying identity and 
group boundaries using Western narratives of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘national unity’ 
can overlook the intricacies of identity transformation, and collapse into 
abstracting the categories of agency and identity, conceptualising them as 
‘deviant’ in relation to systemic change (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002).  
A counter claim to that would be that following the events of 2013–2014 in 
Ukraine (protests and the conflict) the issue of the identity of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians has been interpreted rather in the current Western multiculturalist 
framework, where researchers have leaned more toward highlighting the 
inclusive, civic bases of national identity. When these lenses are applied to 
Ukraine, the fragmented nature of Russian-speakers’ identities and the multiple 
and porous boundaries between groups are brought to light. Most recently, 
Ukrainian scholars (Kulyk, 2017, 2018; Kuzio, 2015a, 2015b) have focused on 
re-incorporating Russian-speaking Ukrainians as a group within the national 
identity narrative and have, to some degree, attempted to de-securitise the issue 
of the Russian language. Kulyk (2017, 2018) claimed that Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians’ identity is in transformation, and Ukraine overall is ‘shedding 
Russianness’. I largely agree with the general conclusions that these studies 
have put forward as concerns the public discourse; however, I argue that they 
still approach identity in the Ukrainian context without considering what the 
concepts of ‘nationality’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ actually mean to people, how 
they have been formed as a result of particular historical circumstances and 
exist to uphold societal structures. Now these concepts cannot be understood 
without considering the political and social circumstances that have led to a 
need for the re-consideration of ‘identity’ in Ukraine.  
This study approaches the challenge of investigating identity ontologically 
and in a particular historical context through a framework that unites several 
concepts: symbolic boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) and ontological 
narrativity (Somers, 1994) emphasise the dynamics of border construction, 
rather than borders and groups themselves; cultural trauma (Sztompka, 2000a) 
provides a lens for looking at identity transformation in times of conflict; social 
practice theory (Couldry, 2012; Shove et al., 2012) and transnationalism 
(Vertovec, 2007) conceptualise group identity construction in the larger context 
of an intensifying state of super-diversity arising from the permeability of state 
borders, especially in the digital domain. The framework addresses a larger 
challenge of theorising identity construction in the context of conflict with a 
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larger, historically dominant state and the permeability of borders, where the 
competition between national identity narratives has higher stakes.  
As a result of applying this framework, I reached the conclusion that while 
the results from the everyday level of identity performance generally support 
Kulyk’s (2017, 2018) projections, ‘shedding’, i.e. the exclusion of, ‘Russianness’ 
proves to be much more nuanced and complex, thus encouraging a continuation 
of the discussion in more constructivist terms (following Korostelina, 2013; 
Knott, 2018). My research has shown that, as a result of the conflict, new 
configurations between basic national identity narrative elements, as understood 
in ontological terms, have emerged in Ukraine. These configurations have made 
it increasingly harder to maintain hybrid national identities for subjects from 
peripheral regions in Ukraine, and have facilitated the adoption of either 
Ukrainian or Russian national identity narratives.  
The investigation of ontological narratives accompanying the Crimean 
annexation led to the identification of three distinct stories (of supporters, non-
supporters and the ambivalent). The three narratives operate by selecting and 
emplotting events that happened in Ukraine and Russia over a long period of 
time: from the Soviet era through the 1990s and 2000s, the Maidan revolution 
(Revolution of Dignity), the annexation and the conflict in Donetsk and 
Luhansk in 2013–2014. Looking at the established narratives, supportive 
participants’ accounts reflected on the newly established boundary breaking up 
the imagined ‘Slavic’ unity between Ukraine and Russia, while non-supportive 
participants were instead concerned with a newly actualised boundary inside the 
Crimean community, which undermined its integrity and denied the previous 
existence of the community in the minds of its residents. Both supporters and 
non-supporters negotiated their multiple loyalties in a changed environment and 
engaged in ‘sense-making work’ to conceptualise their ties with both states they 
were separated from and the polarised local communities they inhabited. In line 
with Sztompka’s argument, the narratives of change mirrored larger public 
discourses, and relied heavily on widely circulated information, helping partici-
pants ‘make sense’ of their personal experiences (Sztompka, 2000a, 2004). The 
limited number of events that residents experienced, contextualised in larger 
narratives they were exposed to through media, provided material for the 
construction of ontological narratives: narratives that help people function as 
social actors (Somers & Gibson, 1993).  
Ultimately, the peculiarity of the situation in Ukraine (and in Crimea, in this 
case) was not that people had to choose sides, but rather that they had to 
construct sides, as a result of changed material and symbolic circumstances, 
configurations of meaning attached to previous events, and shifts in meta-narra-
tives (Somers and Gibson, 1993) that structured their social existence (living in 
peace vs living in conflict). The construction and constant consolidation of 
borders arose at the same time as the people’s need to position themselves vis-
à-vis these borders on a daily basis through mundane performative acts. The 
process of border construction and self-positioning happened in a compressed 
amount of time, and the identification targets were more dynamic than they 
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would be in a ‘regular’ stable society. That is why not only self-positioning 
practices, but also negotiation strategies in conjunction with everyday practices 
are worth including in the discussion, as they help explain fundamental concepts 
that underpin subjects’ self-understanding. The meta-narratives of progress, 
authenticity, globalisation and the advancement of individual rights featured 
prominently in ontological narratives performed by the subjects, informing their 
views of state development (e.g. seeing both Ukraine and Russia as fleeing from 
the Soviet past) and self-work (what one needs to do to remain part of society). 
This is new input into the earlier discussions on Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ 
conceptualisations of national and ethnic identity. 
Ontological narratives that reflect the actualised boundaries between com-
munities support previous assumptions that Knott (2018) made about the specific 
environments in peripheral regions in Ukraine where Ukrainian and Russian 
identity categories were collapsing. The conflict arguably made formerly 
overlapping identities of ‘Ukrainians’ and ‘Russians’ in the peripheral regions 
mutually exclusive: they could no longer easily be held at the same time. The 
main rift concerned values and policies, as reflected in the results of both 
Studies I and II, more than any linguistic/cultural practices. The protests of the 
Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014) were framed as a turn to a more democratic, 
civic-oriented society for more pro-Ukrainian participants, while they were 
interpreted as a complete rejection of ‘common Slavic values’ by pro-Russian 
participants, thus undermining the imagined ‘Slavic (comm)unity’ of Ukraine 
and Russia. In the context of the reinterpretation of the events of 2013–2014 and 
assigning new meanings to configurations of concepts (state-nationality-citizen-
ship), new meanings were attributed to mundane practices, such as the language 
of communication and media practices. Ontological narratives acted as spaces 
where coping with the new environment happened, as well as attempts to re-
negotiate the meaning of some practices.  
Thus, both the protests of 2013 (the Revolution of Dignity) and the 2014 
annexation of Crimea were emplotted in a configuration that contributed to a 
shift in the Ukrainian national identity discourse, and also in Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians’ identity constructions. Arguably, a community cannot conceive of 
themselves as ‘trans-border’ or transnational if they do not interact with borders, 
if the borders don’t exist or are extremely ‘soft’, which was the case before the 
conflict. The new context prompted the appearance of what can be seen as both 
‘reactive nationalism’ (following Portes & Rumbaut’s (2001) ‘reactive ethnicity’) 
and ‘reactive transnationalism’ (Redclift & Rajina, 2019).  
Another aim of this research has been to look into the re-construction of the 
ontological security of members of a group faced with the sudden consolidation 
of borders and finds itself in a possibly precarious (as a result of the conflict) in-
between position. As mentioned above, Russia acted as a dominant (in a cultural 
sense) power that permeated several life-spheres in Ukraine, including the media 
and culture. In this context, Russian-speaking Ukrainians did not experience a 
lack of social capital or a pressing need to re-negotiate their identities. On the 
other hand, the onset of the conflict led to border solidification and, it can be 
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argued, to a certain devaluation of the social capital of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians. Having a multitude of options available, Russian-speaking partici-
pants had to choose strategies that would help them maintain comfort, subject 
integrity and access to social capital, and strike a delicate balance between 
aligning with the newly constructed symbolic borders and innovating them to 
integrate a new ‘Otherness’ into the mainstream, while maintaining coherence 
with previously held meta-narratives of individual freedom, authenticity and 
human progress.  
Reflecting on the findings regarding changes in national and ethnic identity 
narratives and the performances of group boundaries in the context where 
borders didn’t exist before, I have suggested a scheme of different strategies of 
identity construction employed by the Russian-speaking Ukrainians (Figure 4). 
It re-conceptualises them according to the assumed symbolic relationship 
between hybrid subjects (Russian-speaking Ukrainians) and the state, following 
Kwok-Bun & Plüss’s (2013) classification of aligning cross-border loyalties in 
a polarised context. Following this logic, some conceptualisations of Russian-
speaking Ukrainians’ identity are fully compatible with state frameworks and 
the dominant public narrative construction of national identity (Assimilation) 
and are generally followed by the consumption of Ukrainian media and some 
Russian language content that is not framed as having significance. Other con-
ceptualisations attempt to reconstruct hybrid identities within the confines of the 
existing state narrative (Transnationalism), but innovate them by negotiating the 
meaning/significance attributed to various cross-border practices (i.e. speaking 
Russian, consuming Russian media content, maintaining cross-border ties and 
even combining citizenships). What is important is that the national identity, in 
this case, whether construed in cultural or civic terms, is seen as something to 
be negotiated and performed, not something inescapable. The last conceptualisa-
tion (Cosmopolitanism) rejects the hegemony of the state, the national frame-
work and national/ethnic categories altogether, simultaneously framing the indi-
vidual’s life as an attempt to escape institutional rules and narratives that enforce 
these frames. All three strategies are supported by larger meta-narratives that 
make them attractive to subjects who want to maintain social capital and onto-
logical security, although the turbulent social context of Ukraine is more con-
ducive to assimilation supported by state institutions and rules. But the findings 
of Study III also point to the existence of the tension suggested by Kwok-Bun & 
Plüss (2013) between transnationalism, which crosses and creatively combines 
elements from national frameworks (personal ‘transnational projects’), and 
cosmopolitanism, which rejects them altogether. 
A more general conclusion following from Studies II and III is that Russian-
speaking Ukrainians, despite partaking in cross-border practices and, in some 
cases, having transnational identifications, do not frame this as a barrier to being 
part of the titular majority and participating in performing and innovating the 
national identity narrative. Generally, subjects that could operate and provide 
interpretations of events in Ukraine using more general meta-narratives (global 
progress, civic engagement and nation-building) developed more resilient identity 
65 
practices that helped manage the ontological insecurity of the changed social 
situation. The loss of the previous state of ‘weaker’ borders and less prominent 
securitisation, then, was contextualised within the interpretation of the events of 
the Revolution of Dignity (either as a step of nation-building or as a victory of 
civic engagement and respect for human rights). To put it simply, those who gave 
positive meaning to the Revolution of Dignity either felt more comfortable 
adjusting their practices or possessed more agency to re-integrate themselves 
and their (now hybrid) practices into the new national identity narrative, which 
also served to support their social positions. 
The findings of Study III suggest that the latter strategy can be interpreted in 
the light of suggestions by Redclift & Rajina (2019). They posit that the social 
strain of the conflict and shifts in the national narrative can prompt instances of 
both ‘reactive nationalism’ and ‘reactive transnationalism’ in the community, 
which, in the case of Ukraine, can be seen as an almost automatic response to 
the appearance of borders where previously there were none. In this case, I 
suggest the possibility of the existence of both pragmatic, ‘disengaged’ trans-
nationalism, which is just a response to the solidification of borders, and a more 
intended, ‘engaged’ transnationalism, which is an attempt to make sense of 
border solidification by re-negotiating individual identity. The difference 
between disengaged and engaged transnationalisms then would lie in the degree 
of intent to affect the construction of the individual ontological and/or the 
national identity narrative through the performance of transnational practices.  
In terms of a comparison with studies of Russian-speakers in the post-Soviet 
space, a conclusion that I propose is that Russian-speaking Ukrainians have much 
more agency in negotiating, re-producing and changing the national identity 
narrative than, for example, Russian-speakers in Estonia or Latvia (Vihalemm 
et al., 2019; Vihalemm & Juzefovičs, 2020), due to the conceptual differences 
in settings: blurred group boundaries, the interpretation of Euromaidan events in 
civic terms, and the historical entanglement of Ukrainian and Russian cultural 
practices that almost works to deconstruct their essentialistic inescapable quality. 
This should support a more nuanced approach to researching and comparing the 
group’s narratives and borders in the future. In this research, I also aim to 
advance the recent claims made by researchers of transnationalism to look at 
transnational groups and practices intersectionally and historically, paying 
specific attention to legal statuses, class and the state narrative framing of 
minorities/hybridity (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018; Parrado, 2017; 
Waldinger, 2017). I found that historical constructions of the concepts of ‘state’, 
‘nation’ and ‘identity’, as well as particular meanings attributed to recent events 
(which are selected, emplotted and positioned in relation to other events chro-
nologically and geographically) affect responses to social strain in the context 
of polarisation and existing diversity. Everyday practices and speech perfor-
mances performed a multitude of functions in the context where the hybrid 
group (Russian-speaking Ukrainians) do not differ that much from the rest of 
the population in terms of legal status, socio-economic situation (though the 
IDP situation has altered that somewhat), access to cultural and social capital 
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etc. Everyday practices became objects of securitisation during the conflict, 
serving as instruments in border-construction processes. However, simultan-
eously, subjects co-opted their performance and non-performance in ontological 
sense-making work that helped them position themselves and re-establish their 
ontological security in the new context, and even innovate the new national 





This research looked into the dynamics of the production of narratives and, 
consequently, group distinctions in Ukraine by the Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
in the years following a wave of protests (the 2013 Revolution of Dignity) and 
the start of the conflict with Russia (2014). Ukraine presented an interesting 
case: a democratic post-Soviet country with arguably not very strong institutions 
or economy, a resulting tendency to societal polarisation and essentialisation of 
internal politics and national identity discourse, conflict-induced rapid national 
identity-building, ever-present hybridity of linguistic and cultural practices and 
porous borders between groups. For the purposes of clarity, I will repeat the 
research questions that unite the studies in a coherent framework, below: 
 
How has the construction of national identity of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians changed in the context of the conflict with Russia? 
 
1. How do Russian-speaking Ukrainians reflect the political changes re-
sulting from the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in their con-
struction of national and ethnic identity? 
1.1. How is the annexation of Crimea narrated by Crimean residents?  
1.2. How have symbolic boundaries between Ukraine and Russia been 
conceptualised and narrated by Russian-speaking Ukrainians since the 
start of the conflict?  
 
2. How do the Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ discourses around online 
media practices reflect the changes in their construction of Ukraine’s 
national and ethnic identity in the context of the crisis?  
 
3. What role do transnational practices play in the identity construction of 
the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the conflict context? 
3.1. What transnational aspects can be found in the digital media practices 
of Russian-speaking Ukrainians?  
3.2. What role have these practices played in performing identity and civic 
engagement among Russian-speaking Ukrainians since the start of the 
conflict?  
 
4. How can the study of transnational subjects’ identity construction in the 
conflict context be approached theoretically? 
 
 
The main conclusions of the thesis are presented according to the structure of 
the research questions.  
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1. How do Russian-speaking Ukrainians reflect the political changes 
resulting from the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in their con-
struction of national and ethnic identity? 
Both the accounts of Russian-speakers from Crimea (Study I) and from the 
eastern regions (Study II) show that the events of the Revolution of Dignity and 
the annexation are framed as ‘watershed moments’, regardless of one’s position, 
for the symbolic communities of Ukraine and Russia. The conflict was inter-
preted using frameworks that led to the start of a boundary-making process that 
Study I and Study II tracked through various narratives produced by the hybrid 
participants. The study’s conclusion is that the underlying tension behind 
opposing narratives of constructing some borders while deconstructing others 
ultimately concerned the content of the dominant Ukrainian national identity 
narrative. To put it briefly, the deconstruction performed by the Russian-
speaking participants was mostly aimed at elements and practices framed as 
‘cultural’ and ‘nationalistic’ (narrow), but not at civic ones. Conversely, civic 
elements actually provided an additional framework (in the context of opposition 
between ‘democratic Ukraine’ and ‘undemocratic Russia’) for solidifying the 
symbolic boundary between the two states. 
 
1.1. How is the annexation of Crimea narrated by Crimean residents?  
The conclusions of Study I point to the fact that, while the demographic 
composition of the Russian-speaking community in Crimea remained the same, 
the solidification of borders prompted residents to connect their identifications 
much more closely with the national narratives of Ukraine or Russia, moving 
away from local-/region-based identifications.  
I identified three more or less distinct narratives that emerged following the 
events of the annexation among the residents of Crimea. The narratives of the 
supporters and ambivalent participants were found to be rather similar, having 
Maidan (the 2013 Revolution of Dignity) as a central story element and stressing 
the traumatic feeling of the undermined image of unity between Ukraine and 
Russia. The narratives of the non-supporters focused on the loss of unity inside 
the Crimean community, and the military intervention as the traumatic core of 
the story.  
 
1.2. How have symbolic boundaries between Ukraine and Russia been con-
ceptualised and narrated by Russian-speaking Ukrainians since the start of the 
conflict?  
The research supported the assumption that events associated with the 
conflict in Ukraine prompted significant border solidification between the con-
cepts of ‘Ukrainianness’ and ‘Russianness’ in the society. However, for the 
hybrid transnational subjects (Russian-speaking Ukrainians) the border solidi-
fication prompted two types of responses: acceptance of the solidification of 
(some) borders vs. negotiation/denial.  
Different ways to frame the solidification caused the production of various 
strategies of border construction and deconstruction. The strategies of con-
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struction included the following narratives: These are different states (emphasis 
on the formal state attributes, and public and historical narratives); The people 
are different (placing the Ukrainian and Russian populations in opposition to each 
other through dichotomisation of their characteristics); and They represent 
different values (framing the difference through the opposition of democratic vs. 
undemocratic).  
The strategies of border deconstruction included: Staying true to yourself 
(Double Competence) (an emphasis on accepting and reaffirming one’s hybrid 
dissenting characteristics), Manipulation of the people (a narrative of distrust in 
nationalism and denial of the politicisation of life practices), and Particu-




2. How do the Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ discourses around online 
media practices reflect the changes in their construction of Ukraine’s 
national and ethnic identity in the context of the crisis?  
While the conflict created conditions conducive to media homophily (active 
nation-building, distancing from Russia and a ban on Russian resources), the 
digital media practices showed that hybridity was still maintained through 
users’ networks and other micro-level mechanisms. Far from being passive 
receivers of pressure, users exercised their agency by re-shaping their media 
environments to better suit their needs and identifications (unsubscribing, un-
following or deleting friends and, ultimately, changing platforms). The analysis 
of rationalisation strategies for digital media practices focused on two main 
issues: heterophily in information channels and engagement. As a result of the 
analysis, I concluded that heterogeneous and homogeneous practices with high 
levels of engagement produced separate narratives of national identity in post-
conflict Ukraine.  
The choice to construct a feed with a diversity of perspectives (‘to see what’s 
happening on the other side’) served as a basis for users’ identity as know-
ledgeable (media) citizens, while in cases of high engagement homophily as loyal 
supporters of the country in conflict. Media practices were, therefore, securitised 
to a degree even on the lay level, although with significant room to manoeuvre 
for hybrid users. 
 
3. What role did transnational practices play in the identity performance of 
the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the conflict context? 
Based on the investigation of the conceptualisations and rationalisation 
strategies for transnational media practices performed in Study III, I found that 
transnational (heterogeneous) and country-bound (homogeneous) practices with 
high levels of engagement produced separate narratives of national identity in 
post-conflict Ukraine. Both viewed some digital media practices (posting, sharing 
news and other public digital activities) as constitutive expressions of their 
larger offline identities. However, practices characterised by high engagement 
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and homogeneity were rationalised through references to the need to ‘grow’ 
one’s Ukrainian identity and support the state, thus being nation-centric. High 
engagement heterogeneity, however, was rationalised through references to the 
universal human rights/values discourse, and national identity, in this narrative, 
was conceptualised using post-national frames.  
 
 
4. How can the study of transnational subjects’ identity construction in the 
conflict context be approached theoretically? 
In this research, I applied a framework that united several concepts to offer a 
more socio-historically-nested theoretical lens to study identity construction in 
societies undergoing drastic social change. The theoretical framework united 
concepts of symbolic boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) and ontological 
narrativity (Somers, 1994), cultural trauma (Sztompka, 2000a), and trans-
nationalism (Vertovec, 2007). The framework has proven useful as it made it 
possible to focus on the dynamics of border construction, and avoid essentialising 
groups and borders as objects in themselves, as well as problematising identities 
and practices as ‘deviant’ from the processes of nation-building. The addition of 
concepts of ontological narrativity, cultural trauma and transnationalism (though 
these are rarely used together) made it possible to look at how identity narratives 
can act as spaces for coping with both drastic social change and conflict-induced 
polarisation, as well as the ever-increasing hybridity and permeability of state 
borders. Future, more comprehensive research could look into the shifting, over-
lapping and diverging boundaries between the concepts of ethnicity, nationality 
and citizenship in Ukraine: how the map of meanings of these concepts has 
changed since 2013–2014, and what implications for national development this 
might have. This study could then investigate how local and global discourses 
on nationality and citizenship have been adopted, co-opted and innovated by 
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Appendix I.  
Interview guiding notes. Fieldwork I (Crimea, 2016) 
[in Russian] 
Вступление об исследовании. Права участника, мои обязанности.  
Возраст, пол, работа, положение в обществе, семья. Что изменилось в последнее 
время в этом плане? 
Как давно Вы живете в Крыму? 
А чем вы занимаетесь? 
Какое у Вас образование? 
У Вас есть хобби? 
А можете как-то прокомментировать свой социальный статус? Например, средний 
класс? 
А можете еще что-нибудь сказать о своем происхождении, национальном или 
этническом? 
Давайте поговорим о недавних событиях в Крыму, об изменении его статуса. Что 
Вы можете об этом сказать в общем? 
А можете как-то прокомментировать Ваши чувства? Что Вы чувствуете сейчас?  
Как Вы узнали об изменении статуса Крыма? Как это происходило? 
А какие чувства у Вас это вызывало в тот момент? 
Оправдались ли Ваши ожидания? 
Как бы Вы описали атмосферу в тот момент и сейчас в Крыму? 
А как бы вы прокомментировали, как это все повлияло на Вас в материальном 
плане? 
А что Вы можете сказать о границе? Как факт возникновения границы влияет на 
Вас? 
Вы вините кого-нибудь в этом или нет? 
А часто ли Вы думаете о жизни в Крыму до изменений? 
На Вас как-то повлиял развал Советского Союза? 
А события Оранжевой революции, Майдана, как вы их воспринимали? 
Что бы Вы чувствовали, если бы в Крыму тоже были жертвы? 
Когда в своей жизни Вы чувствовали себя в наибольшей безопасности? 
У Вас есть родственники в Украине? 
А в России? 
И друзья? 
А изменились ли как-то Ваше общение с ними? 
А стало ли легче или тяжелее общаться с людьми в целом?  
А изменилось ли что-то в плане общения на Вашей работе? Вы общаетесь с 
людьми на работе? 
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Были ли у Вас изменения в плане документов, страхования, больницы? 
Тяжелее или легче Вам жить? 
А содержать себя и свою семью? 
Как изменился Ваш интерес к политике и к окружающим событиям? Стало больше 
или меньше? 
Давайте поговорим о вопросе доверия. Доверяете ли Вы людям больше или 
меньше? 
Прокомментируйте, пожалуйста. 
Доверяете ли Вы государству? России? 
Как часто Вы вспоминаете о том, что случилось в течение одного дня? 
Беспокоитесь ли Вы о своей безопасности? 
А вот отношения в общем между украинцами и россиянами. Кажется ли Вам, что 
они стали более враждебными? 
Как Вы думаете, каким будет будущее Крыма? 
Легче или тяжелее планировать сейчас?  
Тяжелее, потому что нет уверенности того, что будет завтра. 
Чувствуете ли Вы, что мир стал более стабильным или менее стабильным и 
изменчивым? 
Кажется ли Вам, что Вы можете свободно высказываться, не ограничивая свои 
темы для разговора. 
Как Вы думаете, что украинцы думают о крымчанах и изменилась ли их точка 
зрения? 
А что россияне думают о крымчанах и как изменилось их мнение? 
Как Вам кажется, какие настроения царят в Крыму? О чем в основном говорят 
люди? 
А как они относятся к отключению электричества, к такого рода проблемам? 
К чему вы больше всего привязаны в жизни? 
Как Вам кажется, почему вообще все эти события произошли, присоединение 
Крыма? Ваша интерпретация?  
Чувствовали ли вы, что Вы далеки от политики в Киеве, живя в Крыму?  
Когда это все происходило? 




Interview guiding notes. Fieldwork II (Kyiv, 2018) 
[English/Russian] 
Исследователь (Елена Недожогина) гарантирует анонимность респондентов. Это 
означает: 
 –  запись интервью останется конфиденциальной, даже при использовании 
отрывков текста имена будут заменены псевдонимами, 
 –  то же самое относится к опубликованным результатам исследования (статья), 
 –  при согласии, некоторые примеры из практик использования интернет медиа 
могут быть приведены в статье, но в измененном виде, не допускающем 




Возраст, пол, профессия, образование, регион происхождения. 
Какой язык вы считаете своим родным языком? На каком языке вы говорите 
дома? На работе? На каком языке вы читаете новости, смотрите развлекательные 
передачи, фильмы, читаете книги? 
Как часто и с кем вы испольуете украинский язык в общении? Что это за люди, на 
какие темы вы говорите? 
Какие иностранные языки вы знаете? 




Что для вас самое главное в жизни – что определяет вас как личность? 
С какой национальностью вы чувствуете самую глубокую связь? Есть ли разница – 
в культурном, социальном, политическом, других планах? Как вы проводите 
различия между собой и другими людьми (русскоязычными, россиянами, украин-
цами)? Назовите 3–5 характеристики русскоязычных в Украине вобщем? Русских? 
Что вас различает? Произошли ли какие-либо изменение в вашем понимании этих 
различий после 2014? 
Изменилось ли это чувство после 2014? 
Изменилось ли что нибудь в вашей жизни после 2014? Пожалуйста, опишите 
события своей жизни после 2014. Изменилось ли ваше общение с другими 
людьми? То, какие новости\фильмы\газеты\книги вы читаете или смотрите? 
Какие изменения в повседневной жизни (страны) вы замечаете? 
Комфортно ли вам быть самим собой в Украине? Принимают ли людьми вокруг 
вас таким, какой вы есть? Подумайте, пожалуйста, приходится ли вам менять свое 
поведение, чтобы быть «включенным», интегрированным в жизнь в Украине? 
Как вы относитесь к идее украинской государственности? Что нужно человеку, 
чтобы быть\стать частью украинского общества? Является ли украинское общество, 
по вашему мнению, инклюзивным, или скорее наоборот? 
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Назовите что для вас важнее и почему: (гражданин Украины, украинец, русско-
язычный, россиянин, житель Киева\другого города, славянин, профессия, др). 




Как вы считаете, может ли человек изменить жизнь в стране к лучшему? Как? 
Чувствуете ли вы, что вы учавствуете в жизни страны? Кажется ли вам, что вы 
политически\социально активны? Какими видами деятельности вы занимаетесь? 
Изменилось ли это после 2014?  
Что такое государство – для вас? Что такое – и для чего, гражданство? Госу-
дарство – это помощник или скорее помеха? 
 
 





Как часто вы навещаете другие страны? Есть ли у вас родственники за границей?  
Думаете ли вы когда нибудь переехать заграницу? 
Как бы вы описали ваши отношения с родственниками заграницей и в Украине? 
Как часто вы с ними общаетесь? По каким каналам? Какие темы вы обсуждаете? 
Обсуждаете ли вы политику?  
Ездили ли вы заграницу в последнее время? С какой целью? Есть ли какие то 
страны которые вы навещаете регулярно? 
Сколько друзей у вас в различных социальных сетях? Могли бы вы обозначить на 
карте (описать), откуда они? 
Кто они: друзья, коллеги, бывшие одноклассники, семья, родственники? На какие 
темы вы общаетесь с ними и как часто? 
Видитесь ли вы с ними когда нибудь лично? 
Ваши друзья в социальных сетях – люди с похожими взглядами, или наоборот? 
Приходилось ли вам встречаться с отличными от ваших взглядами в онлайне? 




Что вы думаете о таком утвержденим: в наши дни люди могут жить параллельно\ 
одновременно в 2 или 3 обществах (странах, регионах, городах). Как вам кажется – 
это возможно? Какие приемущества есть у такого стиля жизни? Проблемы? Как 







  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Совсем не подходит мне         очень хорошо меня характеризует
  
 
THINK ALOUD DEMONSTRATION 
Давайте сыграем в игру. Представьте, что вы проснулись с утра. Вы берете свой 
ноутбук – каковы ваши дальнейшие действия? Пожалуйста, проговорите вслух, 




Общее использование медиа 
Как бы вы описали себя как пользователя онлайн медиа? Пожалуйста, подумайте 
про интернет, социальные сети, новости, ютюб. В общем. Как часто вы 
используете их? Это похожие по контенту каналы (одинаковые точки зрения, 
страна происхождения?) Как вы относитесь к запрещению российских ресурсов? 
Случились ли какие-то изменения после 2014? Смотрите ли вы те же новости, 
состоите ли в тех же группах, общаетесь ли с теми же людьми? Пожалуйста, 




Как вы обычно общаетесь с людьми вне Украины: скайп, вайбер, другие прило-
жения? 
(Для каждого канала): С кем и как часто, какие темы вы обсуждаете и с какой 
целью?  
Обсуждаете ли вы политику? События в Украине\России? Сходятся ли у вас 
мнения на разные события? Какого ваше мнение о событиях в Украине и Крыму?  
 
 
С ЭТОГО МОМЕНТА МОЖНО СОПРОВОДИТЬ ДЕМОНСТРАЦИЯМИ 




Откуда вы получаете информацию о новостях? (конкретные источники) 
 
 
В общем и целом, насколько хорошо вы осведомлены о событиях а) в Украине 
б) в вашем регионе в) в мире? 
 
 
Насколько вы заинтересованы в политике? Заинтересованы ли вы в политике 
каких то конкретных стран? Украина? Россия? Как бы вы описали свой интерес к 





На каком языке вы читаете новости? 
Как бы вы описали свой интерес к новостям в общем? Думаете ли вы, что быть в 
курсе событий важно\необходимо в современной жизни? 
Какие темы вас интересуют больше всего? Пожалуйста, опишите, как активно вы 
следите за новостями по этим темам? 
Почему? 
Каквы думаете, возможность читать новости на нескольких языках – это пре-
имущество или недостаток? 
 
Социальные медиа\группы 
О чем (какие темы) вы обычно читаете на ФБ\ВК\других соц медиа? Они больше 
национальные, региональные, местные? 
Почему, как вы думаете? 
Как вам кажется – можете ли вы доверять информации на этих сайтах? Что во-
обще заставляет вас верить чему-либо? Что вызывает у вас недоверие?  
Используете ли вы какую-нибудь информацию из интернета в своей жизни? На 
какие странички вы подписаны? Откуда эти странички? Они местные или скорее 
зарубежные? Как вы выбираете странички, на которые подписываетесь? Какие 





Пожалуйста, опишите ФБ, ВК и ОК. Какими вы пользуетесь, что вам нравится\не 
нравится в этих СМ? Какой ваш самый любимый? Есть ли что-нибудь, что 
отличает их друг от друга? Используете ли вы их для разных целей? Для каких? В 
каких случаях вы пользуетесь этими сайтами? У вас те же самые или разные 




Вы постите что-нибудь в сетях? Лайкате? Пишите комментарий? Делитесь? 
Загружаете свои фотографии? Общаетесь онлайн с друзьями? Какими еще 
способами вы выражаете себя и свое мнение онлайн? Комментируете ли вы 
новости, пишите блог? Почему? 
 
Пожалуйста, выберите несколько постов (на своей стене или в группах), которые  
А)  больше всего характеризуют вас как личность, 
Б)  собрали больше всего лайков, 
В)  больше всего вам нравятся.  
 
 
Используете ли вы: Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, LinkedIn? Почему?  
Как часто? 
Что вы делаете на этих сайтах: вы активны (постите, отвечаете, комментируете) 
или нет? 
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Используете ли вы соц сети, чтобы узнавать новости? Когда, при каких обсто-
ятельствах? 
Пишите ли вы свой блог – в твиттере или ФБ? Читаете ли вы то, что пишут другие 
люди?  
Подписаны ли вы на каких-нибудь знаменитостей в интернете? Они метсные или 





Как вы пользуетесь ютубом? Есть ли какой то контент, за которым вы постоянно 
следите? Конкретные каналы? Почему именно эти?  
Какой развлекательный контент на ютубе вы смотрите? Знаменитости? Почему? 
Смотрите ли вы телевизионные каналы и передачи на ютубе? Какие передачи 
являются вашими любимыми и почему?  
Вы когда нибудь производили контент сами? Почему?  








Сколько разных имейлов у вас есть? Используете ли вы их для разных целей? 




Закачивали ли вы недавно какие-нибудь фильм через интернет? Какие? 
ТВ шоу или программы? 
















Appendix II. Informed consent form  
ФОРМА СОГЛАСИЯ УЧАСТНИКА 
Hybrid/transnational practices of media audiences in Ukraine 
 
Вы приглашены принять участие в исследовательском проекте докторанта 
Университета Тарту, Института Социальных Исследований, Елены Недожо-
гиной. Прежде чем выразить свое согласие/несогласие, важно, чтобы вы поняли 




Целью проекта является исследование (онлайн) медиа практик и способов 
самовыражения представителей разных групп населения в Украине. Ваше участие 
поможет пролить свет на то, как люди используют различные каналы интернета 
для самоутверждения своей идентичности.  
 
 
Ваши права и анонимность 
Участие в исследовании (интервью) является анонимным и добровольным, и 
может быть прекращено в любой момент интервью. 
 
 
Конфиденциальность и анонимность гарантируются на всех стадиях ис-
следования.  
Проект подчиняется международным стандартам, которые гарантируют аноним-
ность. Записи, сделанные в процессе интервью, будут храниться в защищенных 
паролем папках на сервере университета. Запасные копии будут храниться в 
оффлайн режиме. Доступ ко всем файлам будет принадлежать только исследо-
вателю. Записи буду архивированы на сервере университета только на время 
проведения проекта, и будут уничтожены в течение 12 месяцев после его 
окончания.  
Вся информация будет анонимизирована. Это означает, что для защиты ваших 
прав, ни ваше имя, ни имена ваших знакомых/друзей/упомянутых вами людей не 
будут опубликованы. Вместо этого, псевдонимы будут использованы, любая 
чувствительная информация будет заменена на Х, скриншоты не будут использо-
ваться. 
Этические принципы, описанные выше, соответствуют международным стан-
дартам. 
Анонимизированная информация будет использована для написания различных 
публикаций. Если вы хотите получить копии, обратитесь к исследователю. 
 
 
Что от вас требуется: 
1) Участие в интервью (1–1.5 часов) 
2) При согласии, исследователь может попросить вас продемонстрировать 
некоторые медиа практики, напр. показать обычную рутину использования 
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социальных сетей, активности в группах, либо чтения новостей в интернете. В 
процессе демонстрации, исследователь может только делать пометки и записи, 
но не скриншоты. В последствии, данная информация может быть исполь-




Чтобы подтвердить, что вы согласны на участие в проект и осведомлены о своих 
правах и обязанностях, подпишите ниже. 
 



















SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Venekeelsete ukrainlaste identiteediloome  
pärast 2013–2014-nda aasta sündmusi 
Doktoritöö käsitleb venekeelsete ukrainlaste identiteediloome muutusi pärast 
Maidani proteste ning selle järgnenud konflikti Venemaaga. Tuginen kollek-
tiivse identiteedi sotsioloogilistele ja etnograafilistele käsitlustele ning vene-
keelsete ukrainlastega läbiviidud intervjuudele. Selgitan Krimmist ja Ida-Ukrai-
nast pärit venekeelsete ukrainlaste individuaalsete identiteedinarratiivide kuju-
nemist ning strateegiaid ‘meie’ ja ‘nende’ grupi vaheliste sümboolsete piiride 
ümberkonstrueerimisel. 
Teoreetiliselt problematiseerin oma töös rahvusliku identiteedi seniseid uni-
versalistlikke käsitlusi Ukraina uuringutes ning soovitan kasutada ajaloolisemat, 
konkreetse aja ning kohaga seotud käsitlusviisi (Somers ja Gibson 1993). Minu 
käsitlus lähtub subjektide sotsiaalsetest suhetest konkreetsel ajahetkel ning 
nende meediakasutust ja kollektiivset mälu kujundavate institutsionaalsete 
praktikate muutuse analüüsist. Olen sünteesinud kultuurilise trauma, ontoloogi-
lise narratiivsuse ning sümboolsete piiride käsitlusi, mõtestamaks ‘rohujuure 
tasandil’ toimuvaid igapäevaseid identiteediloome protsesse. Samuti olen oma 
analüüsis arvestanud venekeelsete ukrainlaste piiriüleste, hargmaiste meedia-
kasutuse- ja suhtluspraktikatega, mida Ukraina-Venemaa konflikt tugevasti 
mõjutab. 
Minu uuringute tulemused näitavad, et nii Krimmi kui Ida-Ukraina vene-
keelsete elanike identiteediloomet on Maidani murrangulised sündmused ning 
Ukraina-Venemaa konflikt tugevasti mõjutanud. Sõltumata isiklikest poliiti-
listest eelistustest konstrueerivad inimesed uusi sümboolseid piire rahvarühmade 
ja riikide vahel ning „unustavad’ varasemaid piire, püüdes suhestuda uue Ukraina 
identiteedinarratiiviga. Inimesed ei rõhuta enda identiteedinarratiivides kultuuri-
lisi ja etnilise päritolu elemente, tõlgendades neid kui väheolulisi ning toovad 
esile tsiviil-rahvuslikke, demokraatiaga seotud elemente, rõhutamaks uut süm-
boolset piiri „demokraatliku Ukraina’ ja „ebademokraatliku Venemaa’ vahel. 
Hargmaiste meediakasutus- ja suhtluspraktikatega venekeelsete ukrainlaste 
reaktsioonid avalikus poliitilises retoorikas tugevasti eristatud „ukrainluse’ ja 
„venelikkuse’ käsitlustele olid nö läbirääkivad. Mõningaid uusi piiride-tõmba-
misi võeti omaks ja haarati enda identiteedinarratiividesse, mõnede uute piiri- 
tõmbamiste vastu aga protestiti. Tuvastasin kolm põhinarratiivi: Ukraina toeta-
jate ja ambivalentse poliitilise lojaalsusega venekeelsete narratiivid keskendusid 
mõlemad Maidani revolutsioonilistele sündmustele (orig. Революція гідності) 
kui sümboolsele keskpunktile ning Ukraina-Vene ühtsuse kuvandi lagunemisest 
tekkinud traumaatilisele kogemusele. Ukraina rahvusliku poliitika mittetoetajate 
narratiivide traumaatiline tuum oli Krimmi kogukonna ühtsuse lõhkumine ning 
sõjaline sekkumine. 
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Kui Ukraina riiklikus poliitikas Venemaa meedia keelustati, siis venekeelsed 
ukrainlased säilitasid isiklikud sotsiaalmeedia võrgustikud ning jälgisid paljudel 
juhtudel edasi ka Venemaa meediakanaleid, säilitades enda hargmaise ja geo-
lopoliitiliste ideoloogiate seisukohalt hübriidse meediatarbimise. Samas kujun-
dasid inimesed ise aktiivselt oma sotsiaalmeedia võrgustikke ja kasutusviise 
ümber vastavalt identiteediloomes toimunud muutustele: mõningate sotsiaal-
meedia tuttavatega suhtlemine lõpetati, mõningate kanalite jälgimisest loobuti 
jms. Eesmärk luua mitmekesiste vaatenurkadega personaalne infovoog („näha, 
mis teisel pool toimub’) ja teadliku meediakodaniku rolli loomine moodustas 
olulise osa uuest identiteediloomest. Venemaa-suunalist meediakasutust nähti 
võimaliku ohuna, kuid püüti seda leevendada läbi individuaalse allikate ja 
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